EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (ALWAYS UNDER CONSTRUCTION)

ACCEPTED

2011 2010
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972

　進化ゲーム理論は, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) から始まったとされている. この論文は非協力ゲーム(戦略形2人ゲーム)のモデルを動物の闘争や共存の分析に適応した. Nash均衡よりも強い進化的に安定な戦略(Evolutionary Stable Strategy, ESS) の概念を提示して, 生物のゲーム的状況において自然淘汰が働く動学的進化プロセスの安定状態を分析した.
　この論文が発表されてから, 様々な研究が行われている. 具体的には次の通りである.

(1) 均衡点の精緻化(refinements of equilibrium points)
　このESSはNash均衡条件と漸近安定条件から成り立っていることが知られている(Bishop and Cannings (1976)). このようにESSを特徴づける研究を均衡点の精緻化と呼ばれているが, この研究として, Bomze(1986), van Damme (1987, 1991)が挙げられる. 例えば 完全均衡(perfect equilibrium, ある一定の確率で非合理的な選択をする, Selten (1975)), プロパー均衡(proper equilibrium, ロバストネス(robustness) の考え方, Myerson (1978) ) との関連やESSとは少し異なる新たな均衡概念として, Swinkels (1992), Thomas (1985)は Evolutionary Stable Set (ES) を提案している. さらにはESSの個数は有限であるなどESSの集合の構造についても調べられている( Haigh(1975) ).

(2) REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
　Taylor and Jonker (1978) はReplicator 方程式という自然淘汰が働く動学的進化プロセス, ESSへの収束するプロセスを示した微分方程式を提示した. このReplicator方程式自体の性質や安定性(大域, 局所), パーマネンスに関してもすでに多くのことが知られている. また離散時間のReplicator方程式についての研究も行われている(Nachbar (1990)). よってこの方程式に関する研究としては, ノイズ(Noise, 最適からのズレ), ドリフト(Drift)を導入する研究やカオスなどの非線形微分方程式に関することになる. ノイズに関する研究では, 伊藤の公式を用いて均衡選択を研究した Fudenberg and Harris (1992), 決定論ノイズを導入し, 最後通告ゲーム(Ultimatum game) において公平な取引の発生を説明した Gale, et al. (1995), Binmore, Samuelson and Vaughan (1995), Birth-Deathプロセスで考察した Binmore and Samuelson (1997), ドリフトについては, Binmore and Samuelson (1994), ドリフトによる均衡選択の問題を分析した Binmore and Samuelson (1999) などがある. 非線形微分方程式に関する研究では, 3本のReplicator方程式があれば, カオスが発生することが知られている. この流れの研究として, Chawanya (1995, 1996)があり, ゲーム力学系と呼ばれている. その他 Hashimoto and Ikegami(2001a,2001b), Tachikawa(2003a,2003b)もある. さらに方程式の数を増やし, 複雑系(complex system) の研究としても行われている. 特にRandom行列を用いた研究として Diederich and Opper (1989), Chawanya and Tokita (2002) などがある. ちなみにこのReplicator方程式は個体群動態(Population Dynamics) の基本方程式であるLotka-Volterra方程式と位相同型であるので, 生物学者にとって扱いやすい方程式の1つである. 例えば Losert and Akin(1983)では対称2人ゲームの枠組みにおいて, 生物学の基本的な結果であるFisherの第1定理を導いている. また Page and Nowak (2002) では, Price の公式のReplicator-Mutator 方程式の同値性を示している.

(3) 確率的進化ゲーム理論(Stochastic Evolutionary Game Theory)
　Kandori(神取), Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993) は摂動付きの有限Markov連鎖を用いて, 確率的進化ゲーム理論(stochastic evolutionary game theory) を定式化した. その後Kandori, et al.は2×2のゲームであったが, Kandori and Rob (1995)はこれをn×nのゲームに一般化した. 一般に進化ゲーム理論はノイズ・摂動が重要である. そこで「ノイズ」という概念を少し変更し, 内生化した研究に, Bergin and Lipman (1996), van Damme and Weibull (2001), Maruta (2002)がある. 一様ではないノイズに Robels (1998), Sandholm and Pausner (1998)がある. また Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001) ではコーディネーションゲームに利得が変化, ノイズを入れ, 均衡選択を分析した. さらに Logitモデル(限定合理性)として研究した Blume (2003)があり, Probitモデル(限定合理性)として研究した Myatt and Wallace (2003)がある. 進化ゲーム理論ではランダムマッチング(random matching) を仮定しているが, 局所的な相互作用を考えた Ellison (1993), Anderlini and Ianni (1996), Araki and Low (2000), Anwar (2001), Ely (2002)などがある. 　また出生・死亡(birth-dealth)過程で進化ゲーム理論の枠組みを構築した Amir and Berninghaus (1996) などもある.

(4) 最適応答反応(Best Response Dynamics), 完全予想動学(Perfect Forsight Dynamics)
　最適応答反応(Best Response Dynamics)はGilboa and Matsui (1991) によって提案された 連続時間, 連続無限人の近視眼的プレーヤーによるモデルである. これに予想を行うことを付け加えたのが, 完全予想動学(Perfect Forsight Dynamics) であり, 均衡選択を研究した Matsui and Matsuyama (1995)がある. Kim (1996), Hofbauer and Sorger (1999, 2002), p-dominance との関連を研究した Oyama (2002)がある.

(5) チープトーク(Cheap Talk)
　チープトーク(Cheap Talk, 費用なしの情報交換) の研究については, Matsui(1991), Warneryd (1991), Sobel(1993), Warneryd(1993), Blume, Kim and Sobel (1993), Kim and sobel (1995), Bhaskar(1998), Hurkens and Schlag(2003)がある. またこれらとは少し異なる Replicator方程式を使用し, チープトークについて研究した

(6) 有限人口(Finite Population)
　このゲームでゲームの参加者は無限に近い有限(無限として記述しているもの多いが, その場合は数学的記述が間違いとなる. 本質は大数の法則が成り立つか否かである.)である.そのため確率的にゆらぎがある場合として, 取り上げられコーディネーション型のゲームの均衡選択に使われることが多い. 具体的には Schaffer (1988), Tanaka (2000a) はKMR-Y (1993)を有限人口を用いて定式化し, コーディネーション型のゲームにおいて均衡選択を行った. Nowak, et al. (2004) はMoran Processを用いて, 繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲームを分析している.

(7) Axelrod Simulation
　Axelrod(1984) 関連の研究としては主にシミュレーションによるアプローチである. そこで記憶期間, 学習の問題などを考慮に入れ, より人間の知能に近づけた場合の問題を研究している. そのため人工知能関連の研究者の参入がある.

(8) 空間構造(Spatial Structure)
　Axelrod(1984)にも記述があるが, 格子モデルで考えた進化ゲーム理論も存在する. 主にシミュレーションによって囚人のジレンマゲームを研究している. Nowak and May (1992, 1993).
　またネットワーク理論を用いて分析する研究も存在する.

(9) Matching
　進化ゲーム理論における大人数(Large Population)の解釈の多くは主体はランダムマッチング(random matching)するという仮定のもとでのゲームであった. それが成り立たない場合の研究として, Bergstrom and Stark (1993), Bergstrom (2003)はAssortative Matching(選り好みマッチング) により, 囚人のジレンマの回避を導いた. またそのサーベイとして, Bergstrom (2002) がある. 生物学では群淘汰(group selection) の議論につながる. 　またランダムマッチングするという仮定のもとであっても, マッチング回数が少ない場合の研究も考察することができる. Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996)では, リスク・ドミナントではなく Pareto効率的な均衡が選択されることを示した.

(11) Risk
Robson (1996a, b), Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) Robson (2001)は良いサーベイとなっている.

(12) Indirect Evolutionary Approach
Guth (1995), Guth and Yaari (1992)から始まったとされている。 Guth and Kliemt (1998), Huck and Oechssler (1999), Guth and Peleg (2001), Berninghaus, Korth and Napel (2007)
また Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 2, Pages 225-369 (April 2001)では特集が組まれている。

(13) Experiment

　実験を説明する理論として, 進化ゲーム理論が用いられるが, Roth and Erev (1995) では,　. Van Huyck et al.(1997) では, Coordinationゲームを取り上げている. また Cason, et al. (2002) ではタカ=ハトゲームの構造をしている2人の間で行われる公共財の供給ゲーム(2ステージからなる)について日本とアメリカで実験している.

(14) Application
　経済学の応用に関して書かれている論文として, Friedman (1991), Kandori (1997) が有名である.

　Cournot市場の進化ゲーム理論の考え方を応用した論文にVega-Redondo(1997)がある. この論文を基礎にして, Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004)は失敗が協調を導くとし, Alos-Ferrer(2004)ではメモリーの問題を, Baron, Durieu, Haller, and Solal (2004) では適応学習を用いて考察している. また寡占市場を有限人口の観点から行った研究として, Tanaka (1999, 2000b, 2001)がある.

　Sandholm (2001)ではPotential Game に

　共有資源のゲームに進化ゲーム理論を応用した研究として, Sethi and Somanathan (1996) がある. Noailly, et al. (2003), Noailly, et al. (2007), Noailly (2008), Noailly, et al. (2009)

　進化ゲーム理論を応用したファイナンス理論として, 川西(2008), Shapiro (2009)などがある.



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ACCEPTED

2011 2010
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972


[EVOLUTIONARY GAME](Newest to Oldest) 　BOOKDUIDE

ACCEPTED
  1. Dong-Mei Shi, Yong Zhuang, Bing-Hong Wang : ''Effect of depreciation of the public goods in spatial public goods games,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.10.006. [HP]
  2. Qian Zhuang, Dong Wang, Ying Fan, Zengru Di : ''Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous population with influential individuals,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.10.009. [HP]
  3. Matthijs van Veelen and Martin Nowak : ''Multi-player games on the cycle,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.031. [HP]
  4. Harmen de Weerd and Rineke Verbrugge : ''Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.034. [HP]
  5. Mariana Lozada, Paola D’Adamo and Miguel Angel Fuentes : ''Beneficial effects of human altruism,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.08.016. [HP]
  6. Jozsef Garaya and Zoltan Varga : ''Survivor’s dilemma: Defend the group or flee?,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2011.08.003. [HP]
  7. Ross Cressman, Jie-Wen Song, Bo-Yu Zhang and Yi Tao : ''Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.030. [HP]
  8. Matthijs van Veelen, Julian Garcia, Maurice W. Sabelis and Martijn Egas : ''Group selection and inclusive fitness are not equivalent; the Price equation vs. models and statistics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.025. [HP]
  9. Zhi-Hua Li : ''Lifetime and fitness: Life process in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.07.045. [HP]
  10. Tatsuya Sasaki and Tatsuo Unemi : ''Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.026. [HP]
  11. Robert A. Laird : ''Green-beard effect predicts the evolution of traitorousness in the two-tag Prisoner’s Dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.07.025. [HP]
  12. Qi-Qing Song, Zhen-Peng Li, Chang-He Fu and Lai-Sheng Wang : ''Optional contributions have positive effects for volunteering public goods games,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.07.025. [HP]
  13. Luciano Andreozzi : ''Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.001. [HP]
  14. Ryoji Sawa : ''Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics,'' International Journal of Game Theory, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0299-1. [HP]
  15. Burton Simon, Jeffrey A. Fletcher and Michael Doebeli : ''Hamilton's rule in multi-level selection models,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.014. [HP]
  16. Shinsuke Suzuki and Hiromichi Kimura : ''Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.019. [HP]
  17. Jeromos Vukov, Francisco C. Santos and Jorge M. Pacheco : ''Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.022. [HP]
  18. Pierre Buesser, Jorge Pena, Enea Pestelacci and Marco Tomassini : ''The influence of tie strength on evolutionary games on networks: An empirical investigation,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.07.021. [HP]
  19. Angelo Antoci, Simone Borghesi and Marcello Galeotti : ''Environmental options and technological innovation: an evolutionary game model,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-011-0238-0. [HP]
  20. Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Guangming Xie and Long Wang : ''Effects of encounter in a population of spatial prisoner’s dilemma players,'' Theoretical Population Biology, doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2011.06.007. [HP]
  21. Lili Denga, Wansheng Tang and Jianxiong Zhang : ''The coevolutionay ultimatum game on different network topologies,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.06.076. [HP]
  22. Tadeusz Platkowski and Jan Zakrzewski : ''Asymptotically stable equilibrium and limit cycles in the Rock-paper-scissors game in population of players with complex personalities,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.06.041. [HP]
  23. Cheng-yi Xia, Zhi-qin Ma, Yi-ling Wang, Jin-song Wang and Zeng-qiang Chen : ''Enhancement of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game on weighted lattices,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.06.064. [HP]
  24. Manuela A.D. Aguiar : ''Is there switching for replicator dynamics and bimatrix games?,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, doi:10.1016/j.physd.2011.06.016. [HP]
  25. Emin Dokumaci and William H. Sandholm : ''Large deviations and multinomial probit choice,'' Journal of Economic Theory, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.013. [HP]
  26. Xiu-Lian Xu, Chun-Hua Fu, Hui Chang and Da-Ren He : ''An evolution model of complex systems with simultaneous cooperation and competition,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.06.024. [HP]
  27. Russell Golman : ''Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents,'' Journal of Economic Theory, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.007. [HP]
  28. Marco Archetti and Istvan Scheuring : ''Review: Game Theory of Public Goods in One-Shot Social Dilemmas without Assortment,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.018. [HP]
  29. Christoph Hauert and Lorens A. Imhof : ''Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.010. [HP]
  30. Rick Durrett and Daniel Remenik : ''Evolution of dispersal distance,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, DOI: 10.1007/s00285-011-0444-2. [HP]
  31. Matthijs van Veelen : ''Robustness against indirect invasions,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010. [HP]
  32. Cars H. Hommes and Marius I. Ochea : ''Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.014. [HP]
  33. Yuanshi Wang, Hong Wu and Shigui Ruan : ''Periodic orbits near heteroclinic cycles in a cyclic replicator system,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, DOI: 10.1007/s00285-011-0435-3. [HP]
  34. Chaitanya S. Gokhale and Arne Traulsen : ''Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games with multiple strategies,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.05.031. [HP]
  35. Ingela Algera and Jorgen W. Weibull : ''A generalization of hamilton's rule - love thy sibling how much?,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.05.008. [HP]
  36. Andrew M. Colman, Lindsay Browning and Briony D. Pulford : ''Spontaneous similarity discrimination in the evolution of cooperation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.05.022. [HP]
  37. Thomas W.L. Norman : ''Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.005. [HP]
  38. John Duffy, Alexander Matros and Ted Temzelides : ''Competitive behavior in market games: Evidence and theory,'' Journal of Economic Theory, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.013. [HP]
  39. Arne Traulsen and Floyd A. Reed : ''From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032. [HP]
  40. Partha Dasgupta : ''Dark Matters: Exploitation as Cooperation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.020. [HP]
  41. Yu Wu, Mingjun Zhang, Jing Wu, Xiaopeng Zhao and Lijin Xia : ''Evolutionary game theoretic strategy for optimal drug delivery to influence selection pressure in treatment of HIV-1,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, DOI: 10.1007/s00285-011-0422-8. [HP]
  42. Marc Harper : ''Escort evolutionary game theory,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, doi:10.1016/j.physd.2011.04.008. [HP]
  43. Robert Axelrod : ''Launching “The Evolution of Cooperation”,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.015. [HP]
  44. Karl Sigmund : ''Moral assessment in indirect reciprocity,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.024. [HP]
  45. Benjamin Allen, Arne Traulsen, Corina E. Tarnita and Martin A. Nowak : ''How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.034. [HP]
  46. Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson : ''Sex and evolutionary stability ,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.02.024. [HP]
  47. J. Durieu, P. Solal and O. Tercieux: ''Adaptive learning and p-best response sets ,'' International Journal of Game Theory, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0266-2. [HP]
  48. Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco and Brian Skyrms: ''Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and cooperation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.01.004. [HP]
  49. Russell Golman: ''Why learning doesn’t add up: equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules,'' International Journal of Game Theory, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0265-3 [HP]
  50. Thorsten Hens, Terje Lensberg, Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe and Peter Wohrmann: ''An evolutionary explanation of the value premium puzzle,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0213-1 [HP]
  51. Dale O. Stahl: ''Cooperation in the sporadically repeated prisoners’ dilemma via reputation mechanisms,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0204-2. [HP]
  52. Constanza Fosco, Friederike Mengel: ''Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks,'' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.002 [HP]
  53. Lang Cao, Hisashi Ohtsuki, Bing Wang and Kazuyuki Aihara: ''Evolution of cooperation on adaptively weighted networks,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.008. [HP]
  54. Ruben J. Requejoa and Juan Camacho: ''Evolution of cooperation mediated by limiting resources: Connecting resource based models and evolutionary game theory,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.005. [HP]
  55. Werner Guth, Loreto Llorente Erviti and Anthony Ziegelmeyer: ''Asymmetric information without common priors: an indirect evolutionary analysis of quantity competition,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0205-1. [HP]
  56. Hui Zhang, Meng Gao and Zizhen Li: ''The ambivalent effect of lattice structure on a spatial game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.11.032. [HP]
  57. Takuya Sekiguchi and Mayuko Nakamaru: ''How inconsistency between attitude and behavior persists through cultural transmission,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.11.044. [HP]
  58. Jia Gao, Zhi Li, Yongkui Liu and Long Wang: ''The effect of recommended role models in prisoner’s dilemma game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.10.048. [HP]
  59. Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Kainan Huang: ''Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: are they different species?,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0203-3. [HP]
  60. Werner Guth, Loreto Llorente Erviti and Anthony Ziegelmeyer: ''Asymmetric information without common priors: an indirect evolutionary analysis of quantity competition,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0201-5. [HP]
  61. Susanne Buchner, Werner Guth and Luis M. Miller: ''Individually selecting among conventions - an evolutionary and experimental analysis,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0197-x. [HP]
  62. Tomohiko Konno: ''A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.033. [HP]
  63. Marco Archetti: ''Contract theory for the evolution of cooperation: The right incentives attract the right partner,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.025. [HP]
  64. Carlos Grilo and Luis Correia : ''Effects of asynchronism on evolutionary games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.022. [HP]
  65. Christoph Kuzmics: ''On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.002. [HP]
  66. Weicai Zhong, Hussein A. Abbass, Axel Bender, and Jing Liu: ''Mixed strategy and coevolution dynamics in social networks,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.09.031. [HP]
  67. Kuiying Deng, Herbert Gintis and Tianguang Chu: ''Strengthening strong reciprocity,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.037. [HP]
  68. Tobias Galla: ''Imitation, internal absorption and the reversal of local drift in stochastic evolutionary games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.035. [HP]
  69. Peter A. I. Forsyth and Christoph Hauert: ''Public goods games with reward in finite populations,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, DOI: 10.1007/s00285-010-0363-7. [HP]
  70. Run-Ran Liua, Chun-Xiao Jia, and Bing-Hong Wang: ''Heritability promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.08.043. [HP]
  71. Ulrich Berger: ''Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.009. [HP]
  72. Makoto Nakata, Atsuo Yamauchi, Jun Tanimotoa and Aya Hagishima : ''Dilemma game structure hidden in traffic flow at a bottleneck due to a 2 into 1 lane junction,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.08.005. [HP]
  73. Jianlei Zhang, Chunyan Zhang and Tianguang Chu : ''Cooperation enhanced by the ‘survival of the fittest’ rule in prisoner's dilemma games on complex networks,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.08.011. [HP]
  74. Hauert, Christoph : ''Replicator dynamics of reward & reputation in public goods games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.08.009. [HP]
  75. Xiao-Heng Deng, Yi Liu, and Zhi-Gang Chen : ''Memory-based evolutionary game on small-world network with tunable heterogeneity,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.08.004. [HP]
  76. Mostafa Salehi, Hamid R. Rabiee, and Mahdi Jalili : ''Motif structure and cooperation in real-world complex networks,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.08.001. [HP]
  77. Ying-Ting Lin, Han-Xin Yang, Zhi-Xi Wu and Bing-Hong Wang : ''Promotion of cooperation by aspiration-induced migration,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.07.034. [HP]
  78. Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Luis R. Izquierdo, and Fernando Vega-Redondo : ''The option to leave: Conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.039. [HP]
  79. Tadeusz Platkowski : ''Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.018. [HP]
  80. Feng Fu, Martin A. Nowak and Christoph Hauert: ''Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: Prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.042. [HP]
  81. Haifeng Zhang, Michael Small, Hanxin Yang and Binghong Wang: ''Adjusting learning motivation to promote cooperation,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.06.023. [HP]
  82. Matthias Hanauske, Jennifer Kunz, Steffen Bernius and Wolfgang Konigc: ''Doves and hawks in economics revisited An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.06.007 [HP]
  83. Jianlei Zhang, Xiaojie Chen, Chunyan Zhang, Long Wang and Tianguang Chu: ''Elimination mechanism promotes cooperation in coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.06.005. [HP]
  84. Marcelo Alves Pereira and Alexandre Souto Martinez : ''Pavlovian Prisoner's Dilemma - analytical results, the quasi-regular phase and spatio-temporal patterns,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.05.022. [HP]
  85. Akio Iwagamia and Naoki Masuda : ''Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.05.010. [HP]
  86. Manuela A.D. Aguiar and Sofia B.S.D. Castro : ''Chaotic switching in a two-person game,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, doi:10.1016/j.physd.2010.04.007. [HP]
  87. Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jorg Oechssler and Simon Weidenholzer : ''Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: Theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust,'' Journal of Economic Theory, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.014. [HP]
  88. Jia Gao, Zhi Li, Te Wu and Long Wang : ''Diversity of contribution promotes cooperation in public goods games ,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.04.018. [HP]
  89. Jun Tanimoto : ''Effect of assortativity by degree on emerging cooperation in a 2×2 dilemma game played on an evolutionary network,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.03.020. [HP]
  90. Da Zhou, Bin Wu and Hao Ge : ''Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.03.018. [HP]
  91. Shun Kurokawa, Joe Yuichiro Wakano and Yasuo Ihara : ''Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors,'' Theoretical Population Biology, doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002. [HP]
  92. Matthijs van Veelen, Julian Garcia and Leticia Aviles : ''It takes grouping and cooperation to get sociality,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.043. [HP]
  93. Zhuo Chen, Jianxi Gao, Yunze Cai and Xiaoming Xu : ''Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in flocks,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.02.052. [HP]
  94. Erwin Frey : ''Evolutionary game theory: Theoretical concepts and applications to microbial communities,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.02.047. [HP]
  95. G.A. Parker, S. Immler, S. Pitnick and T.R. Birkhead : ''Sperm competition games: Sperm size (mass) and number under raffle and displacement, and the evolution of P2,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.03.003. [HP]
  96. Yongkui Liu, Zhi Li, Xiaojie Chen and Long Wang : ''Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma on square lattices,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.02.008. [HP]
  97. Alejandro Rosas : ''Evolutionary game theory meets social science: Is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.015. [HP]
  98. A. Nemetha and K. Takacs : ''The paradox of cooperation benefits,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.005. [HP]
  99. Jun Tanimoto and Atsuo Yamauchi : ''Does “game participation cost” affect the advantage of heterogeneous networks for evolving cooperation?,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.01.033. [HP]
  100. Masanori Takezawa and Michael E. Price : ''Revisiting “The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups”: Continuous reciprocity in the repeated N-person prisoner's dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.028. [HP]
  101. Zhaojin Xu, Zhen Wang and Lianzhong Zhang : ''Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.025. [HP]
  102. S. Hummert, C. Hummert, A. Schroter, B. Hube and S. Schuster : ''Game theoretical modelling of survival strategies of Candida albicans inside macrophages,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.022. [HP]
  103. Hisashi Ohtsuki : ''Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.016. [HP]
  104. Mauro Mobilia : ''Oscillatory dynamics in rock-paper-scissors games with mutations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.008. [HP]
  105. Shimpei Koike, Mayuko Nakamaru and Masahiro Tsujimoto : ''Evolution of cooperation in rotating indivisible goods game,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.12.030. [HP]
  106. Fei Ding, Yun Liu, Bo Shen and Xia-Meng Si : ''An evolutionary game theory model of binary opinion formation,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.12.028. [HP]
  107. Min Lin, Nan Li, Liang Tian and Da-Ning Shi : ''Spatial evolutionary game with bond dilution,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.12.029. [HP]
  108. Xian-Bin Cao, Wen-Bo Dua and Zhi-Hai Rong : ''Evolutionary public goods game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous investment,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.044. [HP]
  109. Yaron Azrieli : ''Categorization And Correlation In A Random-Matching Game,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.015. [HP]
  110. Zhiwei Cui and Jian Zhai : ''Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.014. [HP]
  111. Satoshi Uchida, and Karl Sigmund : ''The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.11.013. [HP]
  112. Haifeng Zhang, Hanxin Yang, Wenbo Du, Binghong Wang and Xianbin Cao : ''Evolutionary public goods games on scale-free networks with unequal payoff allocation mechanism,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.029. [HP]
  113. Xianyu Bo : ''Other-regarding preference and the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex networks,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.032. [HP]
  114. Bo Xianyu and Jianmei Yang : ''Evolutionary ultimatum game on complex networks under incomplete information,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.026. [HP]
  115. M. Ji, C. Xu, Da-Fang Zheng and P.M. Hui : ''Enhanced cooperation and harmonious population in an evolutionary N-person snowdrift game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.017. [HP]
  116. Yixiao Li, Xiaogang Jin, Xianchuang Su, Fansheng Kong and Chengbin Peng : ''Cooperation and charity in spatial public goods game under different strategy update rules,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.010. [HP]
  117. Ei Tsukamoto and Susumu Shirayama : ''Influence of the variance of degree distributions on the evolution of cooperation in complex networks,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.10.002. [HP]
  118. Takashi Uehara and Yoh Iwasa : ''Global mutations and local mutations have very different effects on evolution, illustrated by mixed strategies of asymmetric binary games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.09.025. [HP]
  119. Fabio A.C.C. Chalub and Max O. Souza : ''From discrete to continuous evolution models: A unifying approach to drift-diffusion and replicator dynamics,'' Theoretical Population Biology, doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2009.08.006. [HP]
  120. Ross Cressman and Jozsef Garay: ''A predator-prey refuge system: Evolutionary stability in ecological systems,'' Theoretical Population Biology, doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2009.08.005. [HP]
  121. Kevin R. Abbott: ''Background evolution in camouflage systems: A predator-prey/pollinator-flower game,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.09.001. [HP]
  122. Jing Wang, Xiaojie Chen and Long Wang: ''Effects of migration on the evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with community structures ,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.09.003. [HP]
  123. Wen-Bo Du, Xian-Bin Cao and Mao-Bin Hu: ''The effect of asymmetric payoff mechanism on evolutionary networked prisoner’s dilemma game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.08.026. [HP]
  124. Carlos Alos-Ferrer and Nick Netzer: ''The logit-response dynamics,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.004. [HP]
  125. Murat Alanyali : ''A Note on Adjusted Replicator Dynamics in Iterated Games,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.08.001. [HP]
  126. Hannelore De Silva, Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen and Karl Sigmund : ''Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, doi:10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8. [HP]
  127. Y.C. Ni, C. Xu, P.M. Hui and N.F. Johnson : ''Cooperative behavior in evolutionary snowdrift game with bounded rationality,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.07.045. [HP]
  128. Thierry Vignolo : ''Imitation and selective matching in reputational games,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, doi:10.1007/s00191-009-0156-6. [HP]
  129. Chongmin Kim and Kam-Chau Wong : ''Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.005. [HP]
  130. Wolfram Elsner : ''The process and a simple logic of ‘meso’. Emergence and the co-evolution of institutions and group size,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 10.1007/s00191-009-0158-4. [HP]
  131. Corina E. Tarnita, Tibor Antal and Martin A. Nowak : ''Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.07.028. [HP]
  132. Dong-Mei Shi, Han-Xin Yang, Mao-Bin Hu, Wen-Bo Du, Bing-Hong Wanga and Xian-Bin Cao : ''Preferential selection promotes cooperation in a spatial public goods game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.07.031. [HP]
  133. Wen-Bo Du, Xian-Bin Cao, Lin Zhao and Mao-Bin Hu : ''Evolutionary games on scale free networks with a preferential selection mechanism,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.07.012. [HP]
  134. Max O. Souza, Jorge M. Pacheco and Francisco C. Santos : ''Evolution of cooperation under N-person snowdrift games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.07.010. [HP]
  135. Karolina Safarzynska and Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh : ''Evolutionary models in economics: a survey of methods and building blocks,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, doi:10.1007/s00191-009-0153-9 [HP]
  136. Joost C.M. Uitdehaag : ''The dependency game: Multiperson reciprocal sharing leads to stable cooperation which can evolve into group formation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.009. [HP]
  137. Krzysztof Mogielskia and Tadeusz Patkowski : ''A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas ,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.007. [HP]
  138. Yasunori Ohtsuka and Yukihiko Toquenag : ''The patch distributed producer-scrounger game,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.002. [HP]
  139. Jeremy Kendal, Luc-Alain Giraldeau and Kevin Laland : ''The evolution of social learning rules: Payoff-biased and frequency-dependent biased transmission,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.05.029. [HP]
  140. Kulakowski, Krzysztof and Gawronski, Przemyslaw : ''To cooperate or to defect? Altruism and reputation,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.05.001. [HP]
  141. Matthijs van Veelen : ''Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: When inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.04.019. [HP]
  142. Ezoe, Hideo : ''Dual lattice model of the evolution of facultative symbiosis with continuous Prisoner's Dilemma game,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.04.023. [HP]
  143. Qian, Xiaolan and Yanga, Junzhong: ''The evolution of cooperation on structured population,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.04.025. [HP]
  144. Qian, Xiaolan and Yang, Junzhong: ''Evolutionary game in a structured population: Theory and application,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.04.037. [HP]
  145. Gokhale, Chaitanya, Iwasa, Yoh, Nowak, Martin A. and Traulsen, Arne : ''The pace of evolution across fitness valleys,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.04.011 [HP]
  146. Stark, Oded and Behrens, Doris A. : ''An evolutionary edge of knowing less (or: On the ‘curse’ of global information) ,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, doi:10.1007/s00191-009-0137-9. [HP]
  147. Corina E., Tarnita , Hisashi, Ohtsuki , Tibor, Antal , Feng, Fu , Martin A., Nowak: ''Strategy selection in structured populations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035. [HP]
  148. Florian, Herold , Christoph, Kuzmics : ''Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.010. [HP]
  149. Arapaki, Eleni : ''Uncertainty of cooperation in random scale-free networks,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.03.018. [HP]
  150. Yang, Dong-Ping, Shuai, J.W., Lin, Hai and Wu, Chen-Xu : ''Individual’s strategy characterized by local topology conditions in prisoner’s dilemma on scale-free networks ,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.03.013. [HP]
  151. Moyanoa, Luis G. and Sanchez, Angel : ''Evolving learning rules and emergence of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma ,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.002. [HP]
  152. Karev, Georgiy P. : ''On mathematical theory of selection: continuous time population dynamics,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, 10.1007/s00285-009-0252-0. [HP]
  153. Golman, Russell and Page, Scott E. : ''Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 10.1007/s00191-009-0136-x. [HP]
  154. Hashimoto, Koh and Aihara, Kazuyuki : ''Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.004. [HP]
  155. Du,Wen-Bo, Cao, Xian-Bin, Hu, Mao-Bin, Yang, Han-Xin and Zhou, Hong : ''Effects of expectation and noise on evolutionary games,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.02.012. [HP]
  156. Lipowski, Adam, Gontarek, Krzysztof and Ausloos, Marcel : ''Statistical mechanics approach to a reinforcement learning model with memory,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.01.028. [HP]
  157. Bergin, James and Bernhardt, Dan : ''Cooperation through imitation,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.008. [HP]
  158. Roberto da Silva, Gustavo A. Kellermann, and Luis C. Lamb : ''Statistical fluctuations in population bargaining in the ultimatum game: Static and evolutionary aspects,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.017. [HP]
  159. Young, H. Peyton : ''John Nash and evolutionary game theory,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.007. [HP]
  160. Engelmann, Dirk and Fischbacher, Urs : ''Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006. [HP]
  161. Casey G. Rothschild : ''The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.004. [HP]
  162. Benno Woelfing and Arne Traulsen : ''Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.025. [HP]
  163. Istvan Scheuring : ''Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.022. [HP]
  164. Drew Fudenberg and Satoru Takahashi : ''Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014. [HP]
  165. Ross Cressman : ''Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space,'' International Journal of Game Theory, 10.1007/s00182-008-0148-z. [HP]
  166. Shapiro, Dmitry : ''Evolution of Heterogeneous Beliefs, Asset Overvaluation,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.10.003. [HP]
  167. Benaima, Michel, Hofbauer, Josef and Hopkins, Ed : ''Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.09.003. [HP]
  168. Apaloo, J. : ''Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.10.029. [HP]
  169. Friedman, Daniel and Singha, Nirvikar : ''Equilibrium Vengeance,'' Games and Economic Behavior, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.006. [HP]


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2011
  1. H. Peyton Young : ''Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 71, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 12-13. (Special Issue In Honor of John Nash ) [HP]
  2. Samuel Rota Bulo, Immanuel M. Bomze : ''Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 71, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 193-211. (Special Issue In Honor of John Nash ) [HP]
  3. Naoki Masuda and Mitsuhiro Nakamura : ''Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 278, Issue 1, 7 June 2011, Pages 55-62 . [HP]
  4. Ryota Iijima: ''Heterogeneous information lags and evolutionary stability,'' Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 61, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 83-85 . [HP]
  5. Dominic D. P. Johnson and James H. Fowler: ''The evolution of overconfidence,'' Nature, 477, 317-320 (15 September 2011) doi:10.1038/nature10384. [HP]
  6. Jun Zhang, Wei-Ye Wang, Wen-Bo Du, and Xian-Bin Cao: ''Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents with heterogenous view radii,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Volume 390, Issue 12, 15 June 2011, Pages 2251-2257. [HP]
  7. Jun Zhang, Yi-Ping Fang, Wen-Bo Du, and Xian-Bin Cao: ''Promotion of cooperation in aspiration-based spatial prisoner’s dilemma game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Volume 390, Issue 12, 15 June 2011, Pages 2258-2266. [HP]

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2010
  1. Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jorgen W.: ''Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution,'' The American Economic Review, Volume 100, Number 4, September 2010 , pp. 1725-1758(34). [HP]
  2. Manuela A.D. Aguiar and Sofia B.S.D. Castro: ''Chaotic switching in a two-person game,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, Volume 239, Issue 16, 15 August 2010, Pages 1598-1609. [HP]
  3. 阿部高樹, 川上敏和 (2010) : 「制度経済学の様相と諸側面」 商学論集, 第78巻第4号　(2010年3月), pp.3-32. [PDF]

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2009
  1. Netzer, Nick (2009) : ''Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes toward Risk,'' The American Economic Review, Volume 99, Number 3, June 2009 , pp. 937-955(19). [HP]
  2. Robson, Arthur J.; Samuelson, Larry (2009) : ''The Evolution of Time Preference with Aggregate Uncertainty,'' The American Economic Review, Volume 99, Number 5, December 2009 , pp. 1925-1953(29). [HP]
  3. Noailly, Joelle, van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M. and Withagen, Cees A. (2009) : ''Local and global interactions in an evolutionary resource game,'' Computational Economics, Volume 33, Number 2 / 2009年3月, pp.155-173. [HP]
  4. David P. Myatt, Chris Wallace (2009) : ''Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods,'' The Economic Journal, Volume 119, Issue 534, pages 61-90, January 2009 [HP]
  5. Yamamori, Tetsuo : ''Evolutionary Drift in Preference and Equilibrium Selection,'' Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 60, No.3, September 2009, pp.362-375. [HP]
  6. Hofbauer, Josef and Sandholm, William H. : ''Stable games and their dynamics,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 144, Issue 4, July 2009, Pages 1665-1693.e4. [HP]
  7. Tackseung Jun and Rajiv Sethi (2009): ''Reciprocity in evolving social networks,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 19, Number 3, 379-396. [HP]
  8. Domenico Menicucci and Pier Luigi Sacco (2009) : ''Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments,'' The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Volume 33, Issue 4 October 2009 , pages 241 - 276. [HP]
  9. Casey G. Rothschild : ''The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups ,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 257, Issue 4, 21 April 2009, Pages 609-617. [HP]
  10. Mariko Kimura and Yasuo Ihara : ''Replicator-dynamics models of sexual conflict,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 260, Issue 1, 7 September 2009, Pages 90-97. [HP]
  11. Hisashi Ohtsuki, Yoh Iwasa & Martin A. Nowak (2009) : ''Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment,'' Nature, 457(1 January 2009), pp.79-82. [HP]
  12. Van Segbroeck, S., Santos, F.C., Pachecho, J.M., Lenaerts, T. (2009) : ''Reacting differently to adverse ties promotes cooperation in social networks,'' Phys. Rev. Lett., 102, 058105. [HP]
  13. Shun Kurokawa and Yasuo Ihara (2009) : ''Emergence of cooperation in public goods games,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society B,, 7 April 2009 Vol. 276 no. 1660 1379-1384. [HP]
  14. Wakano, Joe Yuichiro, Nowak, Martin A. and Hauert, Christoph (2009) : ''Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, May 12, 2009 vol. 106, no. 19 7910-7914. [HP], [PDF]
  15. Mitsuru Kikkawa (2009) : ''Statistical Mechanics of Games ― Evolutionary Game Theory ―,'' Progress of Theoretical Physics Supplement, No. 179 (2009), pp.216-226. [HP]
  16. Alja Ule, Arthur Schram, Arno Riedl, Timothy N. Cason (2009) : ''Indirect Punishment and Generosity Toward Strangers,'' Science, Vol. 326. no. 5960 (18 December 2009), pp. 1701-1704. [HP]
  17. Diekmann O. and van Gils S. A. (2009) : ''On the cyclic replicator equation and the dynamics of semelparous populations,'' SIAM J. Appl. Dyn. Syst., Vol. 8, pp. 1160-1189. [HP]
  18. 木戸 一夫 (2009) : ''環境変化に依存した周期変動と進化ゲーム,'' 三田商学研究, Vol. 52(3), 47-60, 2009-8. [HP]

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2008
  1. Van Segbroeck, S., Santos, F.C., Pachecho, J.M., Lenaerts, T. (2008): 'The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties,'' BMC Evolutionary Biology, Volume 8, p. 287. [HP]
  2. Horiuchi, Shiro (2008): ''High population density promotes the evolution of ownership,'' Ecological Research, Volume 23, Number 3 / 2008年5月, 551-556. [HP]
  3. David P. Myatt, and Chris Wallace (2008): ''An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 62, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 67-76 [HP]
  4. Christina Pawlowitsch (2008): ''Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 63, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 203-226. [HP]
  5. K. Etessami and A. Lochbihler (2008): ''The computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 37, Number 1 / 2008年4月, pp. 93-113. [HP]
  6. William A. Branch and Bruce McGough (2008): ''Replicator dynamics in a Cobweb model with rationally heterogeneous expectations,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 65, Issue 2, February 2008, Pages 224-244 [HP]
  7. Noailly, Joelle (2008): ''Coevolution of economic and ecological systems,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 18, Number 1 / 2008年2月, pp. 1-29. [HP]
  8. Philipp Langer, Martin A. Nowak and Christoph Hauert (2008): ''Spatial invasion of cooperation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 250, Issue 4, 21 February 2008, Pages 634-641. [HP]
  9. Jorge M. Pacheco, Arne Traulsen, Hisashi Ohtsuki and Martin A. Nowak (2008): ''Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 250, Issue 4, 21 February 2008, Pages 723-731. [HP]
  10. Cuesta, J.A.,Jimenez, R.,Lugo,H.,Sanchez, A. (2008): ''The shared reward dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 251, Issue 2, 21 March 2008, Pages 253-263. [HP]
  11. Jacek Miekisz (2008): ''Evolutionary Game Theory and Population Dynamics,'' Multiscale Problems in the Life Sciences, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, 2008, Volume 1940/2008, 269-316. [HP]
  12. Anna Dreber, David G. Rand, Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak (2008): ''Winers don’t punish,'' Nature, Vol.452(20 March 2008), 348-351. [HP]
  13. David P. Myatt and Chris Wallace (2008): ''When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action,'' Review of Economic Studies, Volume 75, Issue 2, pages 499-527, April 2008. [HP]
  14. 川西 諭 (2008): 「ノイズのある合理的期待均衡モデルにおける投資情報獲得戦略の多様性について」 『現代経済学の潮流2008』, 第4章, 2008年. 【Amazon】
  15. 吉川 満 (2008): 「統計力学を用いた進化ゲーム理論」 『京都大学数理解析研究所講究録』 1597号(2008年5月), pp.220-224. [HP]
  16. 吉川 満 (2008): 「空間構造を持った進化ゲーム理論」 『進化経済学論集』 第12号(2008年3月), pp.441-458.
  17. 吉川 満 (2008): 「進化ゲーム理論の数理」 『北海道大学数学講究録』 Series #126(2008年1月), pp.173-177.

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2007
  1. Brian J. McGill , Joel S. Brown (2007): ''Evolutionary Game Theory and Adaptive Dynamics of Continuous Traits,'' Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, Vol. 38, pp. 403-435. [HP]
  2. J. Tanimoto, and H. Sagara (2007): ''A study on emergence of alternating recirocity in a 2 × 2 game with 2-length memory strategy,'' Biosystems, Volume 90, Issue 3, November-December 2007, Pages 728-737. [HP]
  3. Noailly, Joelle, Withagen, Cees A. and van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M. (2007): ''Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game,'' Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume 36, Number 1 / 2007年1月, 113-141 [HP]
  4. Sandholm, William H. (2007): ''Simple formulas for stationary distributions and stochastically stable states,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 59, Issue 1, April 2007, Pages 154-162. [HP]
  5. Yannick Viossat (2007): ''The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 59, Issue 2, May 2007, Pages 397-407. [HP], [PDF]
  6. Hanazono, Makoto (2007): ''Mimicking the Winner Leads to War: An Evolutionary Analysis of Conflict and Cooperation,'' Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 58(3), pp. 417-422. [HP]
  7. Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions : ''Mean field games,'' Japanese Journal of Mathematics, Volume 2, Number 1 / 2007年3月, 229-260[HP],[Preprint]
  8. Jun, Tackseung and Sethi, Rajiv (2007): ''Neighborhood structure and the evolution of cooperation,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 17, Number 5 / 2007年10月, pp. 623-646. [HP]
  9. Hofbauer, Josef and Sandholm, William H. (2007): ''Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 47-69. [HP]
  10. Sandholm, William H. (2007): ''Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 367-382. [HP]
  11. Dieter Balkenborg and Karl H. Schlag (2007): ''On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 133, Issue 1, March 2007, Pages 295-315. [HP]
  12. Sandholm, William H. (2007): ''Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 641-667. [HP]
  13. Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Christian Korth and Stefan Napel (2007): ''Reciprocity-an indirect evolutionary analysis,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 17, Number 5, 579-603. [HP]
  14. Arne Traulsen Martin A. Nowak and Jorge M. Pacheco (2007): ''Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 244, Issue 2, 21 January 2007, Pages 349-356. [HP]
  15. Arne Traulsen, Jorge M. Pacheco and Martin A. Nowak (2007): ''Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 246, Issue 3, 7 June 2007, Pages 522-529. [HP]
  16. Hisashi Ohtsuki, Jorge M. Pacheco and Martin A. Nowak (2007): ''Evolutionary graph theory: Breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 246, Issue 4, 21 June 2007, Pages 681-694. [HP]
  17. Wakano, Joe Yuichiro (2007): ''Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with common resource dynamics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 247, Issue 4, 21 August 2007, Pages 616-622. [HP]
  18. Hisashi Ohtsuki, Pedro Bordalo and Martin A. Nowak (2007): ''The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 249, Issue 2, 21 November 2007, Pages 289-295. [HP]
  19. Poncela, J., Gomes-Gardenes, Floria, L.M., Sanchez, A., Moreno, Y. (2007): ''Robustness of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on complex networks,'' New Journal of Physics, Volume 9, (2007) 184. [HP]
  20. Szaboa, Gyorgy and Fathb, Gabor (2007): ''Evolutionary games on graphs,'' Physics Reports, Vol.446, pp.97-216. [HP]
  21. Jun Tanimoto (2007): ''Dilemma solving by the coevolution of networks and strategy in a 2×2 game,'' Phys. Rev. E, Vol. 76, 021126 (2007). [HP]
  22. Hisashi Ohtsuki, Martin A. Nowak and Jorge M. Pacheco (2007): ''Breaking the Symmetry between Interaction and Replacement in Evolutionary Dynamics on Graphs,'' Phys. Rev. Lett., Vol.98, 108106 (2007). [HP]
  23. Eddie Dekel, Jeffrey C. Ely and Okan Yilankaya (2007): ''Evolution of preferences,'' Review of Economic Studies, Volume 74 Issue 3, Pages 685 - 704. [HP]
  24. Nakahashi, Wataru (2007): ''The evolution of conformist transmission in social learning when the environment changes periodically,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 72, Issue 1, August 2007, Pages 52-66 [HP]
  25. Wakano, Joe Yuichiro and Aoki, Kenichi (2007): ''Do social learning and conformist bias coevolve? Henrich and Boyd revisited,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 72, Issue 4, December 2007, Pages 504-512. [HP]
  26. 吉川 満 (2007): 「非対称2人ゲームにおける漸近安定な均衡の発生とその進化」 『進化経済学論集』 第11号(2007年2月), pp.450-460.
  27. 吉川 満 (2007): 「時間遅れがあるReplicator方程式」 『関西学院　経済学研究』 第38号(2007年12月), pp.289-304. [HP]
  28. 國上真章, 寺野隆雄 (2007): 「Cournot市場における集団学習ダイナミックスの複雑性」 『情報処理学会論文誌 数理モデル化と応用』 第48号(2007年2月), pp.1-8. [HP]

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2006
  1. Valluri, Annapurna (2006): ''Learning and Cooperation in Sequential Games,'' Adaptive Behavior, Vol. 14, No. 3, 195-209. [HP]
  2. Antal, Tibor and Scheuring, Istvan (2006): ''Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations,'' Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, Volume 68, Number 8 / 2006年11月, pp. 1923-1944. [HP]
  3. Joel S. Brown and Thomas L. Vincent (2006): ''G-functions for the hermeneutic circle of evolution,'' Computers & Operations Research, Volume 33, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 479-499. Game Theory: Numerical Methods and Applications [HP]
  4. Werner Guth, Stefan Napel (2006): ''Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis,'' The Economic Journal, Volume 116, Issue 514, pages 1037-1056, October 2006. [HP]
  5. Kojima, Fuhito (2006): ''Stability and instability of the unbeatable strategy in dynamic processes,'' International Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 2, Number 1, March 2006 , pp. 41-53. [HP], [PDF]
  6. Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (2006): ''The evolution of focal points,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 55, Issue 1, April 2006, Pages 21-42. [HP]
  7. Ohtsuki, Hisashi and Nowak, Martin A. (2006): ''The replicator equations on graphs,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 243, Issue 1, 7 November 2006, Pages 86-97. [HP]
  8. Jorge M. Pacheco, Arne Traulsen and Martin A. Nowak (2006): ''Active linking in evolutionary games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 243, Issue 3, 7 December 2006, Pages 437-443. [HP]
  9. Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., Nowak, M.A. (2006): ''A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks,'' Nature, Vol.441, pp. 502-505 (25 May 2006). [HP]
  10. Bettina Rockenbach and Manfred Milinski (2006): ''The efficient interaction o f indirect reciprocity and costly punishment,'' Nature, Vol.444(7 December 2006), 718-723. [HP]
  11. Traulsen, A., Claussen, J.C., Hauert, C. (2006): ''Coevolutionary dynamics in large, but finite populations,'' Phys. Rev. E, 74, 011901 (2006). [HP]
  12. Arne Traulsen, Martin A. Nowak and Jorge M. Pacheco (2006): ''Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation,'' Phys. Rev. E, 74, 011909 (2006). [HP]
  13. Arne Traulsen, Jorge M. Pacheco and Lorens A. Imhof (2006): ''Stochasticity and evolutionary stability,'' Phys. Rev. E, 74, 021905 (2006). [HP]
  14. Carlos P. Roca, Jose A. Cuesta and Angel Sanchez (2006): ''Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics,'' Phys Rev Lett., 97, 158701 (2006). [HP]
  15. Jorge M. Pacheco, Arne Traulsen, and Martin A. Nowak (2006): ''Coevolution of Strategy and Structure in Complex Networks with Dynamical Linking,'' Phys Rev Lett., 97(25) 2006 December 22: 258103. [HP]
  16. Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco, Tom Lenaerts (2006): ''Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties,'' PLoS Comput. Biol., 2, 1284. [HP]
  17. Santos, F.C., Pacheco, J.M., Lenaerts, T. (2006): ''Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 103, No. 9 (February 28, 2006), pp.3490-3494. [HP]
  18. Santos, F.C., Rodrigues, J.F., Pacheco, J.M. (2006): ''Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol.273, pp.51-55. [HP]
  19. Otsuki, Hisashi and Nowak, Martin A. (2006): ''Evolutionary Games on Cycles,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol.273, pp.2249-2256. [HP]
  20. Hauert, Christoph, Holmes, Miranda and Michael Doebeli (2006): ''Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol.273, pp.2565-2570. [PDF]
  21. 吉川 満 (2006): 「共有資源のゲームにおけるノイズの効果」 『関西学院　経済学研究』第37号(2006年12月), pp.305-324.

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2005
  1. Hauert, Chistoph and Szabo, Gyorgy (2005): ''Game theory and physics,'' American Journal of Physics, Vol. 73, Issue 5, May 2005, pp.405-414. [PDF1], [PDF2]
  2. Victor M. Eguiluz, Martin G. Zimmermann, Camilo J. Cela‐Conde, Maxi San Miguel (2005): ''Cooperation and the emergence of role differentiation in the dynamics of social networks,'' American Journal of Sociology, Volume 110 Number 4 (January 2005): 977-1008. [HP]
  3. Michael Doebeli and Christoph Hauert (2005): ''Models of cooperation based on the prisoner’s dilemma and the snow drift game,'' Ecology Letters, Volume 8 Issue 7, Pages 748 - 766. [HP]
  4. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos. and Ana B. Ania (2005): ''The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior,'' Economic Theory, Volume 26, Number 3 / 2005年10月, pp.497-516. [HP]
  5. Ely, Jeffrey C. and Sandholm, William H. (2005): ''Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 53, Issue 1, October 2005, Pages 83-109. [HP]
  6. Hofbauer, Josef and Hopkins, Ed (2005): ''Learning in perturbed asymmetric games,'' Games Economic Behaviour, Vol. 52 (2005), pp. 133-152. [PDF]
  7. Samuelson, Larry (2005): ''Foundations of Human Sociality: A Review Essay,'' Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 43 , Issue: 2 (June 2005), pp. 488-497. [HP]
  8. Beggs, A.W. (2005): ''On the convergence of reinforcement learning,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 122, Issue 1, May 2005, Pages 1-36. [HP]
  9. Sandholm, William H. (2005): ''Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 124, Issue 2, October 2005, Pages 149-170, Learning and Bounded Rationality. [HP]
  10. Guth, Werner and Ockenfel, Axel (2005): ''The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach,'' Journal of Institutional Economics, Volume 1, pp. 155-174. [HP]
  11. Alpern Steve and Reyniers Diane (2005): ''Strategic mating with common preferences,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 237, Issue 4, 21 December 2005, Pages 337-354. [HP]
  12. Steve Phelps, Simon Parsons and Peter McBurney (2005): ''An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Comparison of Two Double-Auction Market Designs,'' Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3435/2005, 101-114, DOI: 10.1007/11575726_8. [HP], [PDF]
  13. Lieberman, Erez, Hauert, Christoph and Martin A. Nowak. (2005): ''Evolutionary dynamics on graphs,'' Nature, 433, 312-316. [HP]
  14. Duran, O. and Mulet, R. (2005): ''Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma in random graphs,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, Volume 208, Issues 3-4, 1 September 2005, Pages 257-265. [HP]
  15. Claussen, J.C. and Traulsen, A. (2005): ''Non-Gaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process,'' Phys. Rev. E, 71, 025101. [HP]
  16. Jeromos Vukov and Gyorgy Szabo (2005): ''Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on hierarchical lattices,'' Phys. Rev. E, 71, 036133. [HP]
  17. Szabo, G., Vukov, J., Szolnoki, A., (2005): ''Phase diagrams for an evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices,'' Phys. Rev. E, 72, 047107. [HP]
  18. Martin G. Zimmermann and Victor M. Eguiluz (2005): ''Cooperation, social networks and the emergence of leadeship in a prisoner’s dilemma with adaptive local interactions,'' Phys. Rev. E, 72, 056118. [HP]
  19. Arne Traulsen, Jens Christian Claussen, and Christoph Hauert (2005): ''Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations,'' Phys. Rev. Lett., 95, 238701. [HP]
  20. Sandholm, William H. (2005): ''Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation,'' The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 885-915. [HP]
  21. Sabin Lessard (2005): ''Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 68, Issue 1, July 2005, Pages 19-27. John Maynard Smith Memorial Issue [HP]
  22. Alex Possajennikov (2005): ''Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences in symmetric games,'' Theory and Decision, Volume 57, Number 3 / 2004年11月, 227-263 [HP]
  23. 吉川 満 (2005): 「非対称2人ゲームの大域的な分析とノイズの役割 - 最終提案ゲームを例にとって -」 『関西学院　経済学研究』第36号(2005年12月), pp.21-38.

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2004
  1. Christine Taylor, Drew Fudenberg, Akira Sasaki and Martin A. Nowak (2004) : ''Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations,'' Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, Volume 66, Number 6 / 2004年11月, 1621-1644. [HP]
  2. Hauert Christoph, Haiden, Nina and Sigmund, Karl (2004) : ''Equilibrium selection in coordination games: why do dominated strategies matter?,'' Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems Series B, Volume 4, Number 3, Augsut, pp.575-587. [PDF]
  3. Basov, Suren (2004) : ''Equilibrium selection in coordination games: why do dominated strategies matter?,'' Economics Bulletin, Volume 3, No.1, Pages 1-3. [HP], [PDF]
  4. B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, and A. Possajennikov (2004) : ''Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation ,'' European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 20, Issue 4, November 2004, Pages 1045-1057. [HP]
  5. Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson (2004) : ''Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 48, Issue 2, August 2004, Pages 355-384. [HP]
  6. Huck, S., Normann, H-T., and J. Oechssler (2004): ''Through Trial and Error to Collusion,'' International Economic Review, Vol 45, No. 1, pp.205-224. [HP], [PDF]
  7. Bergin, J. and D. Bernhardt (2004) : ''Comparative Learning Dynamics,'' International Economic Review, Volume 45 Issue 2, Pages 431 - 465. [HP], [PDF]
  8. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos (2004): ''Cournot vs. Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory,'' International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 22, Issue 2, February 2004, Pages 193-217. [HP]
  9. Jacek Miekisz (2004): ''Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary games,'' Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General, Volume 37, Number 42, 9891-9906. [HP]
  10. Ohtsuki, Hisashi (2004): ''Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 227, Issue 3, 7 April 2004, Pages 299-314. [HP]
  11. Neill, Daniel B. (2004): ''Evolutionary stability for large populations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 227, Issue 3, 7 April 2004, Pages 397-401. [HP]
  12. Lindsay Browning and Andrew M. Colman (2004): ''Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 229, Issue 4, 21 August 2004, Pages 549-557. [HP]
  13. Margarita Ifti, Timothy Killingback and Michael Doebeli (2004): ''Effects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on the spatial continuous prisoner's dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 231, Issue 1, 7 November 2004, Pages 97-106. [HP]
  14. Jan Alboszta and Jacek Miekisz (2004): ''Stability and evolutionary stable strategies in discrete replicator dynamics with delay,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 231, Issue 2, 21 November 2004, Pages 175-179. [HP]
  15. Chirstoph Hauert & Michael Doebeli (2004): ''Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game,'' Nature, Volume 428, pp. 643-646 (8 April 2004) . [HP]
  16. Nowak, Martin A., Sasaki, Akira, Taylor, Christine and Fudenberg, Drew (2004): ''Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations,'' Nature, Volume 428, pp. 646-650 (8 April 2004). [HP]
  17. Gyorgy Szabo and Jeromos Vukov (2004): ''Cooperation for volunteering and partially random partnerships,'' Phys. Rev. E, 69, 036107. [HP], [PDF]
  18. Martin G. Zimmermann, Victor M. Eguiluz, and Maxi San Miguel (2004): ''Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks,'' Phys. Rev. E, 69, 065102(R). [HP]
  19. Attila Szolnoki and Gyorgy Szabo (2004): ''Phase transitions for rock-scissors-paper game on different networkss,'' Phys. Rev. E, 70, 037102. [HP]
  20. Wild, G., Taylor, P.D. (2004): ''Fitness and evolutionary stability in game theoretic models of finite populations,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol.271, pp. 2345-2349. [HP], [PDF]
  21. Nowak, Martin A. and Sigmund, Karl (2004) : ''Evolutionary dynamics of biologically games,'' Science, Vol. 303. no. 5659(6 February 2004), pp. 793 - 799. [HP]
  22. Michael Doebeli, Christoph Hauert Timothy Killingback (2004) : ''The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors,'' Science, Vol. 306. no. 5697 (29 October 2004), pp. 859 - 862 [HP]
  23. Alex Possajennikov (2004) : ''Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences In Symmetric Games,'' Theory and Decision, Volume 57, Number 3 / 2004年11月, 227-263. [HP]
  24. Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert (2004) : ''The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 65, Issue 1, February 2004, Pages 17-28 [HP]
  25. Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller, and Philipe Solal (2004): ''Stochastic Evolutionary Game Theory,'' in Cognitive Economics: An Interdisciplinary Apporach, Paul Bourgine, Jean-Pierre Nadal (eds.), Springer, 2004/02/20, Ch.11. 【Amazon】
  26. 小山友介, 小林盾, 藤山英樹, 針憤素子, 谷口尚子, 大浦宏邦 (2004): 「社会的ジレンマ問題への学際的接近」, オペレーションズ・リサーチ, Volume 49, No. 12, pp. 733-740. [PDF]

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2003
  1. Hofbauer, Josef and Sigmund, Karl (2003) : ''Evolutionary game dynamics,'' Bulletin-American Mathematical Society, Volume 40, Number 4, Pages 479-519. [PDF]
  2. Christoph Hauert, Gyorgy Szabo (2003) : ''Prisoner's dilemma and public good games in different geometries: compulsory versus voluntary interactions,'' Complexity, Volume 8 Issue 4, Pages 31 - 38. [HP], [PDF]
  3. Benaim, Michel and Weibull, Jorgen W. (2003) : ''Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games,'' Econometrica, Volume 71 (2003) Issue 3, Pages 873 - 903. [HP]
  4. W Guth and S Nitzan (2003) : ''The evolutionary stability of moral objections to free riding,'' Economics & Politics, Volume 9 Issue 2, Pages 133 - 149. [HP]
  5. Oliveira, V.M. de (2003) : ''Replicators with Hebb interactions,'' The European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Volume 31, Number 2 / 2003年1月, 259-263. [HP]
  6. Troy Day and Peter D. Taylor (2003) : ''Evolutionary dynamics and stability in discrete and continuous games,'' Evolutionary Ecology Research, Volume 5, pp. 605-613. [PDF]
  7. Blume, Lawrence E. (2003) : ''How Noise Matters,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 44, Issue 2, August 2003, Pages 251-271 [HP]
  8. Sandholm, William H. (2003) : ''Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 44, Issue 2, August 2003, Pages 343-378. [HP]
  9. Srihari Govindan, Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson: ''A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 45, Issue 2, November 2003, Pages 369-374. [HP]
  10. Bergstrom, Theodore C. 2003.: ''The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation,'' International Game Theory Review, Volume 5, Issue 3 (September 2003), Page 211 - 228. [HP], [PDF]
  11. Gregoire,P.,Robson,A. 2003.: ''Imitation, group selection and cooperation,'' International Game Theory Review, 5,229-247. Volume 5, Issue 3 (September 2003), Page 211 - 228. [HP], [PDF]
  12. Burkhard Hehenkamp (2003).: ''Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model,'' International Game Theory Review, 5,229-247. Volume 5, Issue 3 (September 2003), Page 229 - 247. [HP], [PDF]
  13. S. Hurkens, K.H. Schlag (2003): ''Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 31, Number 4 / 2003年9月, pp.511-526. [HP]
  14. Rajiv Sethi and E. Somanathan : ''Understanding reciprocity,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 50, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 1-27. [HP]
  15. Frankel, David M., Stephen Morris and Ady Pauzner (2003) : ''Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 108, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 1-44. [HP]
  16. David P. Myatt and Chris Wallace (2003) : ''A Multinomial Probit Model of Stochastic Evolution,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 113, Issue 2, December 2003, Pages 286-301. [HP]
  17. Noailly, Joille, van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. and Withagen, Cees A. (2003) : ''Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 13, Number 2 / 2003年4月, 183-200. [HP]
  18. Mayuko Nakamaru and Akira Sasaki (2003) : ''Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game?,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 222, Issue 4, 21 June 2003, Pages 461-470. [HP]
  19. Fort. H. (2003): ''Cooperation and self-regulation in a model of agents playing different games,'' Phys. Rev. E 68, 026118 (2003). [HP]
  20. Masuda, Naoki and Aihara, Kazuyuki (2003): ''Spatial prisoner's dilemma optimally played in small-world networks,'' Physics Letters A Volume 313, Issues 1-2, 23 June 2003, Pages 55-61. [HP]
  21. Robert Boyd, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, and Peter J. Richerson (2003): ''Evolution of altruistic punishment,'' Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Vol. 100(6)(March 18, 2003), 3531-3535. [HP],
  22. Brandt, H., Hauert, C., Sigmund, K (2003): ''Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games,'' Proceedings of The Royal Society London B Vol. 270, pp.1099-1104. [HP1], [HP2],
  23. Tachikawa, Masashi (2003): ''Multiplicity of Limit Cycle Attractors in Coupled Heteroclinic Cycles,'' Progress of Theoretical Physics Vol. 109 No. 1 (2003) pp. 133-138. [HP]
  24. Tachikawa, Masashi (2003): ''An Introduction to Coupled Heteroclinic Cycles,'' Progress of Theoretical Physics Supplement, No.150 (2003) pp. 449-452. [HP]
  25. West, James E. and Linster, Bruce (2003)： ''The Evolution of Fuzzy Rules as Strategies in Two-Player Games,'' Southern Economic Journal, Volume 69, Issue 3 (January 2003) pp. 705-717. [HP]
  26. Daniel S. Falster and Mark Westoby (2003)： ''Plant height and evolutionary games,'' Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Volume 18, Issue 7, July 2003, Pages 337-343. [HP]
  27. 大浦 宏邦 (2003)： 「秩序問題への進化ゲーム理論的アプローチ」, 理論と方法, Volume 18, No. 2, pp.133-152. [HP]
  28. 金井 雅之 (2003)： 「進化ゲームにおける選択的相互作用モデルの意義と課題」, 理論と方法, Volume 18, No. 2, pp.153-167. [HP]
  29. 七條 達弘 (2003)： 「文化進化系進化ゲーム理論による社会的ジレンマ分析」, 理論と方法, Volume 18, No. 2, pp.169-183. [HP]
  30. Yoshimichi SATO (2003)： ''Can Evolutionary Game Theory Evolve in Sociology? : Beyond Solving the Prisoner's Dilemma,'' 理論と方法, Volume 18, No. 2, pp.185-196. [HP]
  31. 志田 基与師 (2003)： 「進化ゲーム理論は数理社会学に応用可能か？」, 理論と方法, Volume 18, No. 2, pp.197-209. [HP]
  32. 河野敬雄 (2003)： 「ゲーム理論アラカルト - 確率論の立場から -」 『Rokko Lectures in Mathematics』, 13. 【PDF】

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2002
  1. Ely, Jeffrey C. (2002) : ''Local Conventions,'' The B.E. Journal in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 2(2002), Issue 1. [HP]
  2. Huw David Dixon, Steven Wallis and Scott Moss (2002): ''Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the Evolutionary Metaphor,'' Computational Economics, Volume 20, Number 3 / 2002年12月, 139-156. [HP]
  3. Ed Hopkins (2002): ''Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games,'' Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 6 (Nov., 2002), pp. 2141-2166. [HP]
  4. Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Takehiko Yamato (2002): ''Voluntary Participation and Spite in Publich Good Provision Experiments: An international Comparison,'' Experimental Economics, Volume 5, Number 2 / 2002年10月, pp. 133-153. [HP]
  5. Hofbauer, Josef and Gehard Sorger (2002): ''A Differential Game Approach to Evolutionary Equilibrium Selection,'' International Game Theory Review, Vol.4, Issue 1 (March 2002) , pp. 17-31. [HP]
  6. Berger, Ulrich (2002): ''Best response dynamics for role games,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 30, Number 4 / 2002年5月, 527-538. [HP]
  7. Guth, Sandra, Guth, Werner and Kliemt, Hartmut (2002) : ''The Dynamics of Trustworthiness Among the Few,'' Japanese Economic Review, Volume 53 Issue 4(December 2002), Pages 369 - 388. [HP]
  8. Bergstrom Ted (2002) : ''Evolution of Social Behaviour: Indivudial and Group Selection,'' Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 16. 67-88. [HP], [PDF]
  9. Maruta, Toshimasa (2002): ''Binary Games with State Dependent Stochastic Choice,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 103, Issue 2, April 2002, Pages 351-376. [HP]
  10. van Damme, E. and J. Weibull (2002): ''Evolution in Games with endogenous Mistake Probabilities,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 106, Issue 2, October 2002, Pages 296-315. [HP]
  11. A. W. Anwar (2002): ''On the Co-Existence of Conventions,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 107, Issue 1, November 2002, Pages 145-155. [HP]
  12. Jorg Oechssler and Frank Riedel (2002): ''On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 107, Issue 2, December 2002, Pages 223-252. [HP]
  13. Oyama, Daisuke (2002): ''p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 107, Issue 2, December 2002, Pages 288-310. [HP]
  14. Tsuyoshi Chawanya and Kei Tokita : ''Large-Dimensional Replicator Equations with Antisymmetric Random Interactions,'' Journal of the Physical Society of Japan, Vol. 71 (2002) pp. 429-431. [HP]
  15. Boyd, Robert and Richerson,Peter J. (2002): ''Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured populations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 215, Issue 3, 7 April 2002, Pages 287-296. [HP]
  16. Hauert, Chirstoph, Monte, Silvia de, Hofbauer, Josef and Sigmund, Karl (2002): ''Replicator dynamics for optional public good games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 218, Issue 2, 21 September 2002, Pages 187-194. [HP]
  17. Page, Karen M. and Nowak, Martin A. (2002): ''Unifying Evolutionary Dynamics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol.219, pp. 93-98. [HP] [PDF]
  18. Zauner, Klaus G. (2002) : ''The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics,'' Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 44, Issue 1, September 2002, Pages 115-120. [HP]
  19. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter (2002) : ''Altruistic punishment in humans,'' Nature, Volume 415(10 January 2002), 137-140. [HP]
  20. Holger Ebel and Stefan Bornholdt (2002) : ''Coevolutionaty games on networks,'' Physical Review E, Volume 66, 056118 (2002). [HP]
  21. Szabo, G., Hauert, C. (2002) : ''Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games,'' Phys. Rev. Lett., Volume 89, 118101. [HP]
  22. Yuzuru Sato, Eizo Akiyama and J. Doyne Farmer (2002): ''Chaos in learning a simple twoperson game,'' Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, Vol. 99, no. 7 (April 2, 2002), 4748-475, [HP]
  23. Sandholm, William H. (2002) : ''Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing,'' The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 69 Issue 3, Pages 667 - 689. [HP]
  24. Christoph Hauert, Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund (2002) : ''Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games,'' Sciences, Vol. 296. no. 5570(10 May 2002), pp. 1129 - 1132. [HP]
  25. Stephens, W., McLinn, C.M., Stevens, J.R. (2002) : ''Discounting and reciprocity in an iterated prisoner's dilemma,'' Sciences, Vol. 298. no. 5601 (13 December 2002), pp. 2216 - 2218. [HP]

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2001
  1. Philip H. Crowley (2001) : ''Dangerous games and the emergence of social structure: evolving memory-based strategies for the generalized hawk-dove game,'' Behavioral Ecology, Vol. 12 No. 6(November 2001), pp. 753-760. [HP]
  2. Krzysztof Burdzy, David M. Frankel and Ady Pauzner (2001) : ''Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World,'' Econometrica, Volume 69 Issue 1, Pages 163 - 189. [HP]
  3. Salmon, Timothy C. (2001): ''An evaluation of econometric models of adaptive learning,'' Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 6 (Nov., 2001), pp. 1597-1628. [HP]
  4. Oechssler, Jorg and Riedel, Frank (2001): ''Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces,'' Economic Theory, Volume 17, Number 1 / 2001年1月, 141-162. [HP]
  5. Hans Jorgen Jacobsen, Mogens Jensen and Birgitte Sloth : ''Evolutionary learning in Signalling games,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 34, Issue 1, January, 2001, Pages 34-63. [HP]
  6. Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (2001): ''Evolution and Mixed Strategies,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 34, Issue 2, February 2001, Pages 200-226. [HP]
  7. Laslier, Jean-Francois, Topol, Richard and Walliser, Bernard (2001): ''A Behavioral Learning Process in Games,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 37, Issue 2, November 2001, Pages 340-366. [HP]
  8. Borgers, Tilman and Sarin, Rajiv (2001): ''Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations,'' International Economic Review, Volume 41 Issue 4, Pages 921 - 950. [HP]
  9. Balkenborg, Dieter and Schlag, Karl H.(2001): ''Evolutionarily stable sets,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 29, Number 4 / 2001年5月, 571-595. [HP]
  10. Tanaka, Yasuhito (2001): ''Evolution to equilibrium in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods,'' International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 19, Issue 9, November 2001, Pages 1423-1440. [HP]
  11. Robson, Arthur J. (2001): ''The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior,'' Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.XXXIX (March 2001), pp.11-33. [HP]
  12. Sugden, Robert (2001): ''The Evolutionary Turn in Game Theory,'' Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 8, pp.113-130. [HP]
  13. Sandholm, William H. (2001): ''Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 1, March 2001, Pages 81-108 [HP]
  14. Samuelson, Larry (2001): ''Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 225-230. [HP]
  15. Ok, Efe A. and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (2001): ''On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: An Incomplete Information Scenario,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 231-254. [HP]
  16. Jeffrey C. Elya and Okan Yilankaya (2001): ''Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 255-272. [HP]
  17. Rajiv Sethi, E. Somanathan (2001): ''Preference Evolution and Reciprocity,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 273-297. [HP]
  18. Alberto Bisin, Thierry Verdier (2001): ''The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 298-319. [HP]
  19. Samuelson, Larry (2001): ''Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 97, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 320-366. [HP]
  20. Werner Guth and Bezalel Peleg (2001): ''When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis: An indirect evolutionary analysis,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 11, Number 5, 479-499. [HP]
  21. David Hirshleifera and Guo Ying Luo (2001): ''On the survival of overconfident traders in a competitive securities market,'' Journal of Financial Markets, Volume 4, Issue 1, January 2001, Pages 73-84. [HP]
  22. Hashimoto, Koh and Ikegami, Takashi (2001): ''Heteroclinic Chaos, Chaotic Itinerancy and Neutral Attractors in Symmetrical Replicator Equations with Mutations,'' Journal of the Physical Society of Japan, Vol. 70 (2001) pp. 349-352. [HP]
  23. Hashimoto, Koh and Ikegami, Takashi (2001): ''Emergence of a New Attracting Set by a Mixed Strategy in Game Dynamics,'' Journal of the Physical Society of Japan, Vol. 70 (2001) pp. 3221-3224. [HP]
  24. Joseph Henrich and Robert Boyd (2001): ''Why people punish defectors:weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of normsin cooperative dilemmas,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 208, Issue 1, 7 January 2001, Pages 79-89. [HP]
  25. Franti ek Slanina and Yi-Cheng Zhang (2001): ''Dynamical spin-glass-like behavior in an evolutionary game,'' Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Volume 289, Issues 1-2, 1 January 2001, Pages 290-300. [HP]
  26. Leimar, Olof and Hammerstein, Peter (2001): ''Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity,'' Proceedings: Biological Sciences, Vol. 268, No. 1468 (Apr. 7, 2001), pp. 745-753. [HP], [PDF]
  27. Hauert, C. (2001): ''Fundamental clusters in spatial 2 × 2 games,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society London B, Volume 4, Issue 3, July 2001, Pages 637-679. [HP], [PDF]
  28. Sandholm, William H. (2001): ''Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change,'' Review of Economic Dynamics, Volume 4, Issue 3, July 2001, Pages 637-679. [HP]
  29. Vincent T. L and Brown J. S. (2001): ''Evolutionarily stable strategies in multistage biological systems,'' Selection, Volume 2, Numbers 1-2 / April 2002, 85-102. [HP]

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2000

  1. Hartvigsen, G., Worden, L., Levin, S.A. (2000) : ''Essays and Commentaries : Global cooperation achieved through small behavioral changes among strangers,'' Complexity, Volume 5 Issue 3, Pages 14 - 19. [HP]
  2. Feltovich, Nick (2000) : ''Reinforcement-based vs. belief-based learning models in experimental asymmetric-information games,'' Econometrica, Vol. 68, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 605-6411. [HP]
  3. Guttman, Joel M. (2000) : ''On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity,'' European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 16, Issue 1, March 2000, Pages 31-50 . [HP]
  4. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos, Ana B. Ania and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe (2000) : ''An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly,'' Games and Economic behavior, Volume 33, Issue 1, October 2000, Pages 1-19. [HP]
  5. Guth, W., Kliemt, H. and Peleg, B. (2000) : ''Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple game of trust,'' German Economic Review, 1, 83-110. [HP], [PDF]
  6. Cabrales, A. (2000): ''Stochastic replicator dynamics,'' International Economic Review, Volume 41 (2000) Issue 2, Pages 451 - 481. [HP], [Preprint]
  7. Cressman R, Gaunersdorfer A, Wen J-F (2000) : ''Evolutionary and dynamic stability in symmetric evolutionary games with two independent decisions,'' International Game Theory Review, Vol. 2, Issue: 1 (March 2000) Page: 67 - 81. [HP]
  8. Alex Possajennikov (2000): ''On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 42, Issue 1, May 2000, Pages 125-129. [HP]
  9. Friedel Bolle (2000): ''Is altruism evolutionarily stable ? And envy and malevolence ?: Remarks on Bester and Guth,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 42, Issue 1, May 2000, Pages 131-133. [HP]
  10. Ostrom, Elinor (2000): ''Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,'' The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 137-158. [HP]
  11. Ellison, Glenn and Fudenberg, Drew (2000): ''Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 90, Issue 1, January 2000, Pages 84-115. [HP]
  12. Hofbauer, Josef and Schlag, Karl H. (2000): ''Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 10, Number 5 / 2000年9月, 523-543. [HP]
  13. Tanaka, Yasuhito (2000b) : ''Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: equivalence of price and quantity strategies,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 34, Issue 2, October 2000, Pages 235-253. [HP]
  14. Gintis, Herbert (2000): ''Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 206, Issue 2, 21 September 2000, Pages 169-179. [HP], [PDF]
  15. Tanaka, Yasuhito (2000a): ''A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game,'' Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 39, Issue 2, March 2000, Pages 195-206. [HP],
  16. Skyrms, Brian (2000) : ''Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models,'' Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 94-113. [HP]
  17. Gyorgy Szabo, Tibor Antal, Peter Szabo, and Michel Droz (2000) : ''Spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with three strategies and external constraints,'' Phys. Rev. E, Vol. 62, pp. 1095-1103. [HP]
  18. Brian Skyrms and Robin Pemantle (2000) : ''A dynamic model of social network formation,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 97, No. 16 (August 1, 2000), pp. 9340-9346. [HP]
  19. Page, K.M., Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K. (2000) : ''The spatial ultimatum game,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society London B, Vol. 267 , 2177-2182. [HP]
  20. Ellison, Glenn (2000) : ''Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution,'' The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 17-45. [HP]
  21. Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page, Karl Sigmund (2000) : ''Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game,'' Science, Vol. 289. no. 5485 (8 September 2000), pp. 1773 - 1775. [HP],
  22. Hofbauer Josef (2000) : ''From Nash and Brown to Maynard Smith: equilibria, dynamics and ESS,'' Selection, Vol. 1, pp. 81-88. [HP], [PDF]
  23. Araki, Kazunori and Low, Hamish (2000) : ''Noisy Convention Selection with Local Interaction,'' Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 28, No. 3, 312-340 (2000) [HP]
  24. Eshel I, Herreiner D, Samuelson L, Sansone E, Shaked A (2000) : ''Cooperation, mimesis, and local interaction,'' Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 28, No. 3, 341-364 (2000) [HP],[PDF]
  25. Thomas L. Vincent and Ross Cressman (2000) : ''An ESS maximum principle for matrix games,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 58, Issue 3, November 2000, Pages 173-186. [HP]
  26. 藤山英樹 (2000): 「リスクをともなう社会での協力の進化的形成 - 閉鎖および開放社会における協力形成の問題点 - 」 『京都大学経済学会 経済論叢』 第165号, 第3号，p.29-46. [HP]

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1999
  1. Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann and Jorg Oechssler (1999) : ''Learning in Cournot Oligopoly-An Experiment,'' The Economic Journal, Vol. 109, No. 454, Conference Papers (Mar., 1999), pp. C80-C95. [HP]
  2. Tanaka, Yasuhito (1999) : ''Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly,'' Economic Theory, Volume 14, Number 3 / 1999年11月, pp. 705-715. [HP],
  3. Ed Hopkins (1999) : ''Learning, matching and aggregation,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 26, Issue 1, January 1999, Pages 79-110. [HP], [PDF]
  4. Steffen Huck and Jorg Oechssler (1999) : ''The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 28, Issue 1, July 1999, Pages 13-24. [HP]
  5. Hopkins, Ed : ''A note on the best response dynamics,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 29, Issues 1-2, October 1999, Pages 138-150. [HP]
  6. Eshel, Ilan, Sansone, Emilia and Shaked, Avner (1999): ''The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 28, Number 4 / 1999年11月, pp.447-463. [HP]
  7. Sethi, Rajiv (1999): ''Evolutionary stability and media of exchange,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 40, Issue 3, November 1999, Pages 233-254. [HP]
  8. Josef Hofbauer and Gerhard Sorger (1999): ''Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 85, Issue 1, March 1999, Pages 1-23. [HP]
  9. Dekel, Eddie and Scotchmer, Suzanne (1999): ''On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 87, Issue 1, July 1999, Pages 125-143. [HP]
  10. Burkhard Hehenkamp and Wolfgang Leininger : ''A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 9, Number 3 / 1999年8月, pp. 367-371 [HP]
  11. Schlag, Karl H. (1999) : ''Which one should I imitate?,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 31, Issue 4, May 1999, Pages 493-522 [HP]
  12. Noldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry (1999): ''How Costly is the Honest Signaling of Need?,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 197, Issue 4, 21 April 1999, Pages 527-539. [HP]
  13. Nowak, Martin, Plotkin, Joshua B. and Krakauer, David C. (1999): ''The evolutionary language game,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 200, Issue 2, 21 September 1999, Pages 147-162. [HP], [PDF]
  14. Brauchli, K., Killingback, T. & Doebeli, M. (1999): ''Evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 200, Issue 4, 21 October 1999, Pages 405-417. [HP], [PDF]
  15. Vanderschraaf, Peter (1999): ''Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice,'' Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 325-358. [HP]
  16. Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson: ''Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection,'' Review of Economic Studies, Volume 66 (1999) Issue 2, Pages 363 - 393. [HP]
  17. Routledge, B. R. (1999): ''Adaptive learning in financial markets,'' Review of Financial Studies, Volume 12, No. 5, pp. 1165-1202. [HP]
  18. 大石英貴 (1999): 「社会ゲームの進化」 『九州工業大学情報工学部紀要 人間科学篇』, 第12巻, 1999年3月, pp. 77-96. [HP]
  19. 上田良文 (1999): 「コモンズ問題とグループアクション - 進化ゲーム理論からのアプローチ -」 『会計検査研究』, 第20巻, 1999年, pp. 51-64. [PDF]

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1998
  1. Eshel, Ilan , Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked (1998) : ''Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model'', The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 157-179. [HP]
  2. Erev, Ido and Roth, Alvin E. (1998) : ''Predicting how people play games: reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria'', The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Sep., 1998), pp. 848-881. [HP]
  3. Epstein, Joshua M. (1998) : ''Zones of cooperation in demographic prisoner's dilemma,'' Complexity, Volume 4 Issue 2, Pages 36 - 48. [HP]
  4. Gary B. Fogel, Peter C. Andrews and David B. Fogel (1998) : ''On the instability of evolutionary stable strategies in small populations,'' Ecological Modelling, Volume 109, Issue 3, 22 June 1998, Pages 283-294. [HP]
  5. Carlsson, Hans and Ganslandt, Mattias (1998) : ''Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games,'' Economics Letters, Volume 60, Issue 1, 1 July 1998, Pages 23-34. [HP]
  6. Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David (1998) : ''Learning in games,'' European Economic Review, Volume 42, Issues 3-5, 31 May 1998, Pages 631-639. [HP]
  7. Sandholm, W. H. and A. Pausner (1998) : ''Noisy Evolution with Population Growth Yields History Dependence,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 22, Issue 1, January 1998, Pages 84-120 [HP]
  8. Sethi, Rajiv (1998) : ''Strategy-Specific Barriers to Learning and Nonmonotonic Selection Dynamics,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 1998, Pages 284-304. [HP]
  9. Helmut Bestera and Werner Guth (1998): ''Is altruism evolutionarily stable,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 34, Issue 2, 15 February 1998, Pages 193-209. [HP], [PDF]
  10. Cheung, Yin-Wong and Friedman, Daniel (1998): ''A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 35, Issue 3, 15 April 1998, Pages 263-280. [HP]
  11. Guo Ying Luo (1998): ''The evolution of money as a medium of exchange,'' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 23, Issue 3, 19 November 1998, Pages 415-458. [HP]
  12. Mailath, George J. (1998) : ''Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory,'' Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 1347-1374. [HP]
  13. Bhaskar, V. (1998) : ''Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 82, Issue 1, September 1998, Pages 110-131 [HP]
  14. Rajeeva Karandikar, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray and Fernando Vega-Redondo (1998): ''Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 80, Issue 2, June 1998, Pages 292-331. [HP]
  15. Jack Robles (1998) : ''Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 79, Issue 2, April 1998, Pages 207-223. [HP]
  16. Schlag, Karl H. (1998) : ''Why Imitate, and If So, How? - A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 78, Issue 1, January 1998, Pages 130-156. [HP]
  17. Friedman, Daniel (1998) : ''On economic applications of evolutionary game theory,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 8, Number 1 / 1998年3月, pp.15-43. [HP]
  18. Walliser, Bernard (1998) : ''A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 8, Number 1 / 1998年3月, pp.67-87. [HP]
  19. Friedman, Daniel (1998) : ''Evolutionary economics goes mainstream: A review of the theory of learning in games,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 8, Number 4 / 1998年12月, 423-432. [HP]
  20. Timothy Killingback and Michael Doebeli (1998) : ''Self-organized criticality in spatial evolutionary game theory,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 191, Issue 3, 7 April 1998, Pages 335-340. [HP]
  21. Day, Troy and Taylor, Peter D. (1998) : ''Unifying genetic and game theoretic models of kin selection for continuous traits,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 194, Issue 3, 7 October 1998, Pages 391-407. [HP]
  22. D'Arms, Justin, Robert Batterman, and Krzyzstof Gorny (1998) : ''Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice,'' Philosophy of Science, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 76-102. [HP],
  23. Gyorgy Szabo and Csaba Toke (1998) : ''Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice,'' Phys. Rev. E, Volume 58, pp. 69-73. [HP], [PDF]
  24. Michael Doebeli and Nancy Knowlton (1998) : ''The evolution of interspecific mutualisms,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, Vol. 95 no. 15 (July 21, 1998), pp.8676-8680. [HP],
  25. Guth, Werner and Kliemt, Hartmut (1998) : ''The indirect evolutionary approach,'' Rationality and Society, Vol. 10, No. 3, 377-399 (1998). [HP],
  26. Bendor, Jonathan and Swistak, Piotr (1998) : ''Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications,'' Theory and Decision, Volume 45, Number 2 / 1998年10月, 99-159. [HP]
  27. Hofbauer,Josef and Sigmund, Karl (1998): Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge University Press. (邦訳): 竹内康博, 佐藤一憲, 宮崎倫子(訳)『進化ゲームと微分方程式』 現代数学社, 2001年. 【Amazon】
  28. 石原英樹 (1998): 「最終提案ゲームの進化論的考察 - L. Samuelsonモデルの再検討 -」 『千葉大学　社会文化科学研究』 第4号, pp.1-14.
  29. 藤山英樹 (1998): 「閉鎖的集団における主体の依存関係の均衡：進化ゲーム理論によるモデル化(1)」 『京都大学経済学会 経済論叢』 第163号, 第4号，p.47-58. [HP], [PDF]
  30. 藤山英樹 (1998): 「閉鎖的集団における主体の依存関係の均衡：進化ゲーム理論によるモデル化(2)」 『京都大学経済学会 経済論叢』 第164号, 第1号，p.67-81. [HP], [PDF]
  31. 田中靖人 (1998): 「寡占の進化ゲーム的分析 ――価格アプローチと数量アプローチの同値性――」 『経済研』 第49巻, 第4号，p.308-316. [HP-1], [HP-2]
  32. 巌佐庸 (1998): 「数理生物学入門」共立出版. 【Amazon】

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1997
  1. Maarten C. Boerlijst, Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund (1997): ''Equal Pay for All Prisoners,'' The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 104, No. 4 (Apr., 1997), pp. 303-305. [HP]
  2. Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak (1997): ''The evolutionary stability of cooperation,'' The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 290-307. [HP]
  3. Fernando Vega-Redondo (1997): ''The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior,'' Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Mar., 1997), pp. 375-384. [HP]
  4. John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio and Frederick W. Rankin (1997): ''On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games,'' The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, No. 442 (May, 1997), pp. 576-596. [HP]
  5. S.A.H. Geritz, E. Kisdi, G. Mesze NA and J.A.J. Metz (1997): ''Evolutionarily singlular strategies and the adaptive　growth and branching of the evolutionary tree,'' Evolutionary Ecology, Volume 12, Number 1 / 1997年1月, pp. 35-57. [HP]
  6. Peter Taylor and Troy Day (1997): ''Evolutionary stability under the replicator and the gradient dynamics,'' Evolutionary Ecology, Volume 11, Number 5 / 1997年9月, pp. 579-590. [HP]
  7. Yin-Wong Cheung and Daniel Friedman (1997) : ''Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 19, Issue 1, April 1997, Pages 46-76. [HP], [PDF]
  8. Maruta, Toshimasa (1997) : ''On the Relationship between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 19, Issue 2, May 1997, Pages 221-234 [HP]
  9. Somanathan, E. (1997) : ''Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 21, Issues 1-2, October 1997, Pages 253-265. [HP]
  10. Noldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry (1997): ''A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 73, Issue 1, March 1997, Pages 118-156 [HP]
  11. Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1997) : ''Muddling Though: Noisy Equilibrium Selection,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 74, Issue 2, June 1997, Pages 235-265. [HP]
  12. Borgers, Tilman and Sarin, Rajiv (1997): ''Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 77, Issue 1, November 1997, Pages 1-14. [HP]
  13. Cheng-Zhong Qin and Charles Stuart (1997): ''Are Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ?,'' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 7, Number 1 / 1997年2月, 41-47. [HP]
  14. Nakamaru, Mayuko and Matsuda , Hiroyuki and Iwasa, Yoh (1997): ''The Evolution of Cooperation in a Lattice-Structured Population,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol.184, pp. 65-81. [HP]
  15. R Cressman, GT Vickers (1997): ''Spatial and density effects in evolutionary game theory,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 184, Issue 4, 21 February 1997, Pages 359-369. [HP]
  16. Maarten C. Boerlijst, Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund (1997) : ''The Logic of Contrition,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 185, Issue 3, 7 April 1997, Pages 281-293. [HP]
  17. Eshel, Ilan, Motro, Uzi and Sansone, Emilia (1997) : ''Continuous Stability and Evolutionary Convergence,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 185, Issue 3, 7 April 1997, Pages 333-343. [HP]
  18. Tao Yi and Wang Zuwang (1997) : ''Effect of Time Delay and Evolutionary Stable Strategy,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 187, Issue 1, 7 July 1997, Pages 111-116. [HP]
  19. J Hofbauer, V Hutson, GT Vickers (1997): ''Travelling waves for games in economics and biology,'' Nonlinear Analysis, Volume 30, Issue 2, December 1997, Pages 1235-1244. Proceedings of the Second World Congress of Nonlinear Analysts [HP]
  20. Mark Rees and Mark Westoby (1997): ''Game-Theoretical Evolution of Seed Mass in Multi-Species Ecological Models,'' Oikos, Vol. 78, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 116-126. [HP]
  21. Challet, D. and Zhang, Y. -C. (1997): ''Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game,'' Physica A: Statistical and Theoretical Physics, Volume 246, Issues 3-4, 1 December 1997, Pages 407-418. [HP], [PDF]
  22. Joseph Apaloo (1997): ''Revisiting strategic models of evolution: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 52, Issue 1, August 1997, Pages 52-71. [HP]
  23. Harms, William (1997): ''Evolution and Ultimatum Bargaining,'' Theory and Decision, Volume 42, Number 2 / 1997年3月, 147-175. [HP]
  24. 荒木一法 (1997): 「学習か公平規範か - 最終提案ゲーム実験をめぐって -」 『早稲田大学政治経済雑誌』 第332号, pp.221-242.
  25. 大石英貴 (1997): 「履歴の情報による戦略の進化」 『九州工業大学情報工学部紀要 人文・社会科学篇』 第10号 (1997-03), pp.155-169. [HP]
  26. Michihiro Kandori : ''Evolutionary game theory in economics,'' in D. M. Kreps and K. F. Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications : Seventh World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs , Vol 1, No 26), Cambridge University Press, 1997/03. [Amazon]
  27. Larry Samuelson (1997): Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, The MIT Press. 【Amazon】

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1996
  1. Sethi, Rajiv and E. Somanathan (1996): ''The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use,'' American Economic Review, Vol.86, pp.766-788. [HP]
  2. Regis Ferriere and Richard E. Michod (1996) : ''The Evolution of Cooperation in Spatially Heterogeneous Populations,'' The American Naturalist, Vol. 147, No. 5 (May, 1996), pp. 692-717. [HP]
  3. Patrick Grim (1996) : ''Spatialization and greater generosity in the stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma ,'' Biosystems, Volume 37, Issues 1-2, 1996, Pages 3-17. [HP]
  4. Dan Ashlocka, Mark D. Smuckerc, E. Ann Stanleya and Leigh Tesfatsion (1996) : ''Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,'' Biosystems, Volume 37, Issues 1-2, 1996, Pages 99-125. [HP]
  5. Rhode, Paul and Stegeman, Mark (1996) : ''A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games,'' Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Mar., 1996), pp. 443-449. [HP]
  6. Bergin, James and Lipman, Barton L. (1996): ''Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations,'' Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Jul., 1996), pp. 943-956. [HP]
  7. Friedman, Daniel (1996): ''Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results,'' The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 434 (Jan., 1996), pp. 1-25 [HP]
  8. T. L. Vincent, M. V. Van and B. S. Goh (1996): ''Ecological stability, evolutionary stability and the ESS maximum principle ,'' Evolutionary Ecology, Volume 10, Number 6 / 1996年11月, 567-591. [HP]
  9. Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996) : ''Pollination and Reward: A Game-Theoretic Approach,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 12, Issue 1, January 1996, Pages 127-142. [HP]
  10. Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni (1996) : ''Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbours,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 13, Pages 141-177. [HP]
  11. Madjid Amir and Siegfried K. Berninghaus (1996) : ''Another Approach to Mutation and Learning in Games,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 14, Issue 1, May 1996, Pages 19-43. [HP]
  12. Robson, Arthur J. (1996): ''The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 14, Issue 2, June 1996, Pages 190-207. [HP]
  13. Kim, Youngse (1996): ''Equilibrium Selection in n-Person Coordination Games,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 15, Issue 2, August 1996, Pages 203-227. [HP]
  14. John H. Miller (1996) : ''The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 29, Issue 1, January 1996, Pages 87-112. [HP]
  15. Sethi, Rajiv (1996) : ''Evolutionary stability and social norms,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 29, Issue 1, January 1996, Pages 113-140. [HP]
  16. Bergstrom, Theodore C. (1996) : ''Economics in a Family Way,'' Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 1903-1934. [HP]
  17. H. Peyton Young (1996) : ''The Economics of Convention,'' The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 105-122. [HP]
  18. Robson, Arthur J. ''A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-expected Utility,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 68, Issue 2, February 1996, Pages 397-424. [HP], [PDF]
  19. Robson, Arthur J. and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996): ''Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 70, Issue 1, July 1996, Pages 65-92. [HP]
  20. Cressman, Ross (1996): ''Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 68, Issue 1, January 1996, Pages 234-248. [HP]
  21. Josef Hofbauer and Jorgen W. Weibull : ''Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 71, Issue 2, November 1996, Pages 558-573 [HP]
  22. Hofbauer, Josef (1996): ''Evolutionary dynamics for bimatrix games: A Hamiltonian system ?,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Vol.34, pp.675-688. [HP]
  23. Chawanya, Tsuyoshi (1996) : ''Infinitely many attractors in game dynamics systems,'' Progress of Theoretical Physics, Vol. 95, pp.679-684. [HP]
  24. C. Wedekind and M. Milinski (1996) : ''Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol.93, No.7 (April 2, 1996), pp. 2686-2689. [HP]
  25. Killingback, T., Doebeli, M. (1996) : ''Spatial evolutionary game theory: hawks and doves revisited,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society London B, vol. 263 no. 1374 (22 September 1996), pp.1135-1144 [HP], [PDF]
  26. Fernando Vega-Redondo (1996): Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour, Oxford University Press. 【Amazon】

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1995
  1. Clements, Kevin C. and Stephens, David W. (1995): ''Testing models of non-kin cooperation: Mutualism and the Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Animal Behaviour, Volume 50, Issue 2, August 1995, Pages 527-535. [HP], [PDF]
  2. Bergstrom, Theodore C. (1995): ''On the Evolution of Altruistic Rules for Siblings,'' The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 58-81. [HP]
  3. Robson, Arthur J. (1995): ''The Evolution of Strategic Behaviour,'' The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 17-41. [HP]
  4. Vincent P. Crawford (1995) : ''Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games,'' Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 103-143 [HP]
  5. Stephen Morris, Rafael Rob and Hyun Song Shin (1995) : ''p-Dominance and Belief Potential,'' Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 145-157. [HP]
  6. Yong-Gwan Kim and Joel Sobel (1995): ''An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication,'' Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 5 (Sep., 1995), pp. 1181-1193. [HP]
  7. Klaus Ritzberger and Jorgen W. Weibull (1995): ''Evolutionary selection in normal form games,'' Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 6 (Nov., 1995), pp. 1371-1399. [HP]
  8. Sasaki, Akira and Ellner, Stephen (1995): ''The Evolutionarily Stable Phenotype Distribution in a Random Environment,'' Evolution, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 337-350. [HP]
  9. Gale, John, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry Samuelson (1995): ''Learning To Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.8, pp.56-90. [HP]
  10. Alvin E. Roth and Ido Erev (1995): ''Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 8, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 164-212. [HP], [PDF]
  11. Binmore Kenneth G., Samuelson Larry and Vaughan Richard (1995) : ''Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 11, Issue 1, October 1995, Pages 1-35. [HP]
  12. Sigmund, Karl and Young, H. Peyton (1995): ''Introduction,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 11, Issue 2, November 1995, Pages 103-110. [HP]
  13. Bomze, Immanuel M. and Weibull, Jorgen W. (1995): ''Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability ?,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 11, Issue 2, November 1995, Pages 173-192. [HP]
  14. Cressman, Ross (1995): ''Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 11, Issue 2, November 1995, Pages 237-253. [HP]
  15. Gaunersdorfer Andrea and Hofbauer Josef (1995): ''Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 11, Issue 2, November 1995, Pages 279-303. [HP]
  16. Sjaak Hurkens (1995) : ''Learning by Forgetful Players,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 11, Issue 2, November 1995, Pages 304-329. [HP]
  17. Y. Kaniovski and H.P. Young (1995): ''Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations,'' Games and Economic Behaivour, Vol. 11 (1995), pp. 330-363. [PDF]
  18. Nowak Martin A. and Sigmund Karl (1995): ''Invasion dynamics for the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Games and Economic Behaivour, Volume 11, Issue 2, November 1995, Pages 364-390. [HP]
  19. Vega-Redondo Fernando (1995) : ''Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 11, Issue 2, November 1995, Pages 391-412. [HP]
  20. Gossner,O (1995) : ''The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies,'' International Journal of Game Theory, 24(1), 1995, 95-107. [HP]
  21. Guth, Werner (1995): ''An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 24, Number 4 / 1995年12月, 323-344. [HP]
  22. W. G. S. Hines (1995) : ''Comment on 'Mutations, Perturbations and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 836-839. [HP]
  23. Jianzhong Wu and Robert Axelrod (1995) : ''How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 183-189. [HP]
  24. Kandori, Michihiro and Rob, Rafael (1995) : ''Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 65, Issue 2, April 1995, Pages 383-414. [HP]
  25. Matsui Akihiko and Matsuyama Kiminori (1995): ''An Approach to Equilibrium Selection,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 65, Issue 2, April 1995, Pages 415-434. [HP]
  26. Boylan Richard T. (1995): ''Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 66, Issue 2, August 1995, Pages 615-625. [HP]
  27. Green Leonard, Price, Paul C. and Hamburger, Merle E. (1995): ''Prisoner's dilemma and the pigeon: Control by immediate consequences,'' Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, Volume 64, Number 1, July 1995, Pages 1-17. [HP]
  28. Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund and Esam El-Sedy (1995): ''Automata repeated games and noise,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 33, Number 7 / 1995年8月, 703-732. [HP]
  29. Patrick Grim (1995): ''The greater generosity of the spatialized prisoner’s dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 173, Issue 4, 21 April 1995, Pages 353-359. [HP]
  30. Joe Repka and Mart R. Gross (1995): ''The evolutionarily stable strategy under individual condition and tactic frequency,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 176, Issue 1, 7 September 1995, Pages 27-31. [HP]
  31. Ilan Eshel and Emilia Sansone (1995): ''Owner-Intruder Conflict, Grafen and Effect and Self-Assessment. The Bourgeois Principle Re-examined,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 177, Issue 4, 21 December 1995, Pages 341-356 [HP]
  32. V. C. L. Hutson and G. T. Vickers (1995): ''The spatial struggle of tit-for-tat and defect,'' Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol. 348, No. 1326 (Jun. 29, 1995), pp. 393-404. [HP]
  33. Leon Hsu, Theodore Hsu, Jamie Mortimer, Mohamed Panju and Sarah Schroeder (1995): ''Dynamically stable multiple strategy states of the iterated prisoner's dilemma ,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, Volume 85, Issues 1-2, 15 July 1995, Pages 296-303. [HP]
  34. Regis Ferriere and Richard E. Michod (1995) : ''Invading Wave of Cooperation in a Spatial Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Proceedings: Biological Sciences, Vol. 259, No. 1354 (Jan. 23, 1995), pp. 77-83. [HP1], [HP2]
  35. Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak (1995) : ''Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 92 no. 8 (April 11, 1995), pp. 3596-3600. [HP]
  36. Chawanya, Tsuyoshi (1995) : ''A new type of irregular motion in a class of game dynamics systems,'' Progress of Theoretical Physics, Vol. 94, pp.163-179. [HP]
  37. Nowak, Martin A., Robert M. May and Karl Sigmund (1995) : ''The arithmetics of mutual help,'' Scientific American, Vol. 272(6): 76-81. [PDF]
  38. 松井柳平 (1995) : 「贈与経済と貨幣経済の進化論的相互作用 : 予備的分析」, 駒沢大学経済学論集, Vol. 27(2)(1995/09): 25-39. [HP]
  39. Weibull, Jorgen W. (1995): Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press. (邦訳): 大和瀬達二(監訳)『進化ゲームの理論』オフィス カノウチ, 1998年. 【Amazon】

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1994
  1. W. G. S. Hines (1994) : ''ESS Modelling of Diploid Populations I: Anatomy of One-Locus Allelic Frequency Simplices,'' Advances in Applied Probability, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 341-360. [HP]
  2. W. G. S. Hines (1994) : ''ESS Modelling of Diploid Populations II: Stability Analysis of Possible Equilibria,'' Advances in Applied Probability, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 361-376. [HP]
  3. Rogers, Alan R. (1994) : ''Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection,'' The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Jun., 1994), pp. 460-481. [HP]
  4. Waldman, Michael (1994) : ''Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection,'' The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Jun., 1994), pp. 482-497. [HP]
  5. Linster, Bruce G. (1994) : ''Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,'' Economic Inquiry, Volume 32 Issue 2, Pages 342 - 357. [HP]
  6. Van Damme, Eric (1994) : ''Evolutionary game theory,'' European Economic Review, Volume 38, Issues 3-4, April 1994, Pages 847-858. [HP]
  7. Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1994): ''Drift,'' European Economic Review, Volume 38, Issues 3-4, April 1994, Pages 859-867. [HP]
  8. Weibull, Jorgen W. (1994): ''The ‘as if’ approach to game theory: Three positive results and four obstacles,'' European Economic Review, Volume 38, Issues 3-4, April 1994, Pages 868-881. [HP]
  9. Yoh Iwasa and Patsy Haccou (1994): ''ESS emergence pattern of male butterflies in stochastic environments,'' Evolutionary Ecology, Volume 8, Number 5 / 1994年9月, 503-523. [HP]
  10. Boylan, Richard T. (1994): ''Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 7, Issue 1, July 1994, Pages 10-34. [HP]
  11. Nowak, Martin A. , Bonhoeffer, Sebastian and May, Robert M. (1994) : ''More spatial games,'' International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (February 1994), Page 33 - 56. [HP] [PDF]
  12. Samuelson, Larry (1994): ''Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies,'' Journal of Economic Theory,, Vol. 64 (1994), pp. 35-65. [PDF]
  13. Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1994): ''An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms,'' Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol.150, 45-63.
  14. M. Broom, C. Cannings and G. T. Vickers (1994): ''Sequential methods for generating patterns of ESS's,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 32, Number 6 / 1994年1月, 597-615. [HP]
  15. Lorberbaum, Jeffrey (1994): ''No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 168, Issue 2, 21 May 1994, Pages 117-130. [HP]
  16. Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund (1994): ''The alternating Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 168, Issue 2, 21 May 1994, Pages 219-226. [HP], [PDF]
  17. Andreas V. M. Herz (1994): ''Collective phenomena in spatially extended evolutionary games,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 169, Issue 1, 7 July 1994, Pages 65-87. [HP]
  18. Werner Guth and Hartmut Kliemt (1994): ''Competition or co-operation: on the evolutionary economics of trust, exploitation and moral,'' Metroeconomica, Volume 45 Issue 2 (June 1994), Pages 155 - 187. [HP]
  19. Kristian Lindgren and Mats G. Nordahl (1994) : ''Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, Volume 75, Issues 1-3, 1 August 1994, Pages 292-309. [HP]
  20. Nowak, Martin A. , Bonhoeffer, Sebastian and May, Robert M. (1994) : ''Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, Vol. 91. No. 11(May 24, 1994), pp.4877-4881. [HP], [PDF]
  21. Marcus R. Frean (1994) : ''The Prisoner's Dilemma without synchrony,'' Proceedings of The Royal Society B Biological Science, Vol. 257 no. 1348 (22 July 1994), pp. 75-79. [HP]

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1993
  1. Bergstrom, Theodore C. and Stark, Oded (1993): ''How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment,'' The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1993), pp. 149-155 [HP], [PDF]
  2. Peter Kollock (1993): ''"An Eye for an Eye Leaves Everyone Blind": Cooperation and Accounting Systems,'' American Sociological Review, Vol. 58, No. 6 (Dec., 1993), pp. 768-786. [HP]
  3. Kandori, Michihiro, George J. Mailath and Rafael Rob (1993): ''Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,'' Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 29-56. [HP]
  4. H. Peyton Young (1993): ''The Evolution of Conventions,'' Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 57-84. [HP], [PDF]
  5. Carlsson,Hans and van Damme, Eric (1993) : ''Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,'' Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 5 (Sep., 1993), pp. 989-1018. [HP]
  6. Glenn Ellison (1993) : ''Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,'' Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 5, (Sep., 1993), pp. 1047-1071. [HP]
  7. Joel Sobel : ''Evolutionary stability and efficiency,'' Economics Letters, Volume 42, Issues 2-3, 1993, Pages 301-312. [HP]
  8. Fudenberg Drew and Kreps David M. : ''Learning mixed equilibria,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 3, July 1993, Pages 320-367. [PDF]
  9. Noldeke Georg and Samuelson Larry (1993): ''An EvolutionaryA nalysis of Backwarda nd Forward Induction,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 3, July 1993, Pages 425-454. [HP]
  10. Swinkels Jeroen M. (1993) : ''Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 3, July 1993, Pages 455-484. [HP], [PDF]
  11. Warneryd, Karl (1993) : ''Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 4, October 1993, Pages 532-546. [HP]
  12. Blume Andreas, Kim Yong-Gwan and Sobel Joel 1993: ''Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 4, October 1993, Pages 547-575. [HP]
  13. Stahl Dale O. : ''Evolution of Smart n Players,'' Games and Economic Behavior Volume 5, Issue 4, October 1993, Pages 604-617. [HP]
  14. Vega-Redondo Fernando : ''Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 4, October 1993, Pages 618-631. [HP]
  15. Nowak, Martin A. and May, Robert M. (1993) : ''The spatial dilemmas of evolution,'' International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, Vol 3 Issue 1 (February 1993), Pages 35 - 78. [HP], [PDF]
  16. Bendor, Jonathan (1993) : ''Uncertainty and the evolution of cooperation,'' The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 709-734. [HP]
  17. Young, Peyton (1993) : ''An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 59, Issue 1, February 1993, Pages 145-168. [HP]
  18. Reboreda, Juan C. and Kacelnik, Alejandro (1993) : ''The role of autoshaping in cooperative two-player games between starlings,'' Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, Volume 60, Number 1, July 1993, Pages 67-83. [HP]
  19. Peck, Joel R. (1993) : ''Friendship and the evolution of cooperation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 162, Issue 2, 21 May 1993, Pages 195-228. [HP]
  20. M Nowak and K Sigmund (1993): ''Chaos and the evolution of cooperation,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 90 No. 11 (June 1, 1993), pp. 5091-5094. [HP]
  21. Huberman, Bernardo A. and Glance, Natalie S. (1993): ''Evolutionary games and computer simulations,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 90. No. 16(August 15, 1993), pp.7716-7718. [HP]
  22. Vincent T. L., Cohen Y. and Brown J. S. (1993): ''Evolution via strategy dynamics,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 44, Issue 2, October 1993, Pages 149-176. [HP]

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1992
  1. Bomze, Immanuel M. and van Damme, Eric C. (1992): ''A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states,'' Annals of Operations Research, Volume 37, Number 1 / 1992年12月, pp.229-244. [HP]
  2. Linster, Bruce G. (1992): ''Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,'' Economic Inquiry, Vol.32, Issue 2, Pages 342 - 357. [HP]
  3. Boyd, Robert; Richerson, Peter J. (1992) : ''Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizeable groups,'' Ethiology and Sociobiology, Vol 13(3), May 1992, 171-195. [HP]
  4. J.S. Brown and T.L. Vincent (1992): ''Organization of predator-prey communities as an evolutionary game,'' Evolution, Vol. 46, No. 5 (Oct., 1992), pp. 1269-1283. Vol.32, Issue 2, Pages 342 - 357. [HP], [PDF],
  5. Peleg, B. and Shmida, A.: ''Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers,'' Games and Economic Behavior Volume 4, Issue 2, April 1992, Pages 232-251. [HP]
  6. Nachbar, John H. (1992) : ''Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 19, Issue 3, December 1992, Pages 307-326. [HP]
  7. Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1992): ''Evolutionary Stability in Games Played by Finite Automata,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 2, August 1992, Pages 278-305. [HP], [PDF]
  8. Swinkels, Jeroen M. (1992) : ''Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 2, August 1992, Pages 306-332. [HP]
  9. Swinkels, Jeroen M. (1992) : ''Evolution and Strategic Stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens,,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 2, August 1992, Pages 333-342. [HP]
  10. Samuelson,Larry and Jianbo Zhang (1992): ''Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.57, pp.363-391. [HP]
  11. Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer : ''On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 2, August 1992, Pages 392-406. [HP]
  12. Cabrales, Antonio and Sobel, Joel (1992) : ''On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 2, August 1992, Pages 407-419. [HP]
  13. Fudenberg, Drew and Harris, Christopher (1992) : ''Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 2, August 1992, Pages 420-441. [HP]
  14. Canning, David (1992) : ''Average behavior in learning models,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 2, August 1992, Pages 442-472. [HP]
  15. Boylan, Richard T. (1992): ''Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.57, pp. 473-504. [PDF]
  16. Skyrms, Brian (1992) : ''Chaos in game dynamics,'' Journal of Logic, Language and Information, Volume 1, Number 2 / 1992年6月, 111-130. [HP]
  17. V. C. L. Hutson and G. T. Vickers (1992): ''Travelling waves and dominance of ESS's,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 30, Number 5 / 1992年4月, pp. 457-471. [HP]
  18. Gilboa,Itazik and Akihiko Matsui (1992): ''A Model of Random Matching,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol.21, pp. 185-197. [HP]
  19. I. M. Bomze (1992): ''A Model of Random Matching,'' Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Volume 75, Number 2 / 1992年11月, 313-329. [HP]
  20. Nowak, Martin and Sigmund, Karl (1992) : ''Tit for Tat in heterogeneous populations,'' Nature, Vol. 355 (16 JANUARY 1992), pp. 250-252. [HP], [PDF]
  21. Nowak, Martin A. and May, Robert M. (1992): ''Evolutionary games and spatial chaos,'' Nature, Vol.359 (29 October 1992), pp. 826-829. [HP], [PDF]
  22. Edalat A. and Zeeman E. C. (1992): ''The stable classes of the codimension-one bifurcations of the planar replicator system,'' Nonlinearity, Vol.5, pp. 921-939. [HP]
  23. Skyrms, Brian (1992): ''Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game dynamics,'' Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1992, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1992), pp. 374-394. [HP]
  24. Guth, W. and M.E. Yaari (1992): ''Explaining reciprocal behavior in simple strategic games: An evolutionary approach,'' in Explaining Process and Change, U. Witt, Ed., pp. 23-34, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1992. 【Amazon】

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1991
  1. Freddy Bugge Christiansen (1991): ''On Conditions for Evolutionary Stability for a Continuously Varying Character,'' The American Naturalist, Vol. 138, No. 1 (Jul., 1991), pp. 37-50. [HP]
  2. Snidal, Duncan (1991): ''Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation,'' The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 701-726. Vol. 59, No. 3, (May, 1991), pp. 637-666 [HP]
  3. Friedman, Daniel (1991): ''Evolutionary Games in Economics,'' Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 3, (May, 1991), pp. 637-666 [HP]
  4. Gilboa, Itzhak and Matsui, Akihiko (1991): ''Social Stability and Equilibrium,'' Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May, 1991), pp. 859-867 [HP]
  5. Miller, John H. and Andreoni, James (1991) ''Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments,'' Economics Letters, Volume 36, Issue 1, May 1991, Pages 9-15. [HP], [PDF]
  6. Kaushik Basu and Jorgen W. Weibull (1991) ''Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior,'' Economics Letters, Volume 36, Issue 2, June 1991, Pages 141-146. [HP]
  7. Warneryd, Karl (1991) : ''Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk,'' Economics Letters, Volume 36, Issue 4, August 1991, Pages 375-378. [HP]
  8. Reinhard Selten (1991) : ''Evolution, learning, and economic behavior,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 3, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 3-24. [HP]
  9. Crawford, Vincent P. (1991) : ''An “evolutionary” interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 3, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 25-59. [HP]
  10. Myerson, Roger, Gregory Pollock and Jeroen Swinkels (1991) : ''Viscous Population Equilibria,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 3, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 101-109. [HP], [PDF]
  11. Samuelson, Larry (1991) : Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 3, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 110-128. [HP]
  12. Young, H. Peyton and Foster, Dean (1991) : ''Cooperation in the Short and in the Long-run,'' Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 3, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 145-156. [HP]
  13. Matsui, Akihiko (1991): ''Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 54, Issue 2, August 1991, Pages 245-258. [HP]
  14. Mesterton-Gibbons, M. (1991): ''An escape from ‘the prisoner's dilemma,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 29, Number 3 / 1991年1月, pp.251-269. [HP]
  15. Cressman, Ross and Dash, A. T. (1991): ''Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 30, Number 1 / 1991年10月, pp. 89 - 99. [HP]
  16. Gaunersdorfer A, Hofbauer Josef and Sigmund Karl (1991): ''On the dynamics of asymmetric games,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 39, pp.345-357. [PDF]

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1990
  1. Nowak, Martin A. and Sigmund, Karl (1990): ''The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma,'' Acta Applicandae Mathematicae, Volume 20, Number 3 / 1990年9月, 247-265. [HP], [PDF]
  2. Drew Fundenberg and Eric Maskin (1990) : ''Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games,'' The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1990), pp. 274-279. [HP]
  3. Joel S. Brown (1990) : ''Habitat Selection as an Evolutionary Game,'' Evolution, Vol. 44, No. 3 (May, 1990), pp. 732-746. [HP]
  4. Nachbar, J. H. : ''Evolutionary selection in dynamics games,'' Internatinal Journal of Game Theory, Volume 19, Number 1 / 1990年3月, pp.59-89. [HP]
  5. R. Cressman and W. G. S. Hines (1990): ''A Note on the Stability of Interior ESSs in a Diploid Population,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 476-477. [HP]
  6. Nowak, Martin A. (1990): ''An evolutionarily stable strategy may be inaccessible,'' Journal Theoretical Biology, Vol.142, pp.237-241. [PDF]
  7. Robson, Arthur J. (1990): ''Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, nash and the secret handshake ,'' Journal Theoretical Biology, Volume 144, Issue 3, 7 June 1990, Pages 379-396. [HP]
  8. Bomze, Immanuel M (1990): ''Dynamical Aspects of Evolutionary Stability,'' Monadshefte fur Mathematik, Vol. 110, pp. 189-206. [HP]
  9. Sabin Lessard (1990): ''Evolutionary stability: One concept, several meanings,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 37, Issue 1, February 1990, Pages 159-170. [PDF]
  10. Nowak, Martin A. (1990): ''Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 38, pp. 93-112. [PDF]
  11. D Foster, P Young (1990): ''Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 219-232. [PDF]

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1989
  1. Mark E. Schaffer: ''Are profit-maximisers the best survivors? A Darwinian model of economic natural selection,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 12, Issue 1, August 1989, Pages 29-45 [HP]
  2. Robert Boyd (1989): ''Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 136, Issue 1, 9 January 1989, Pages 47-56. [HP]
  3. Nowak, Martin, and Karl Sigmund (1989): ''Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 137, Issue 1, 7 March 1989, Pages 21-26. [HP]
  4. GT Vickers (1989): ''Spatial patterns and ESS's.,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 140, Issue 1, 11 September 1989, Pages 129-135. [HP]
  5. Diederich, S. and Opper, M. (1989): ''Replicators with random interactions: A solvable model,'' Physical Review A, Vol.39, Number 8, pp.4333-4336. [HP]
  6. P. D. Taylor (1989): ''Evolutionary stability in one-parameter models under weak selection,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 36, Issue 2, October 1989, Pages 125-143. [HP]
  7. Farrell, Joseph, and Roger Ware (1989): ''Evolutionary stability in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 36, Issue 2, October 1989, Pages 161-166. [HP]

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1988
  1. Pollock, Gregory (1988) : ''Population structure, spite, and the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,'' American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Volume 77 Issue 4, Pages 459 - 469. [HP]
  2. Vincent, T. L. and Brown, J. S. (1988) : ''The Evolution of ESS Theory,'' Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Vol. 19 (November 1988), pp. 423-443. [HP1], [HP2]
  3. Hammerstein, Peter and Riechert, Susan E. (1988) : ''Payoffs and strategies in territorial contests: ESS analyses of two ecotypes of the spider Agelenopsis aperta,'' Evolutionary Ecology, Volume 2, Number 2 / 1988年4月, pp.115-138. [HP]
  4. T.L. Vincent and M.E. Fisher (1988) : ''Evolutionarily stable strategies in differential and difference equation models,'' Evolutionary Ecology, Volume 2, Number 4 / 1988年10月, pp. 321-337. [HP]
  5. John Haigh (1988) : ''The Distribution of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 233-246. [HP]
  6. Hirshleifer, Jack and Juan Carlos Martinez Coll (1988) : ''What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation ?,'' The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 367-398 . [HP]
  7. Robert G. Hansen and William F. Samuelson (1988) : ''Evolution in Economic Games,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 10, Issue 3, October 1988, Pages 315-338. [HP]
  8. Schaffer, Mark E. (1988) : Evolutionarily stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size. Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 132, Issue 4, 21 June 1988, Pages 469-478 [HP]
  9. Maynard Smith, John. 1988: ''Can a mixed strategy be stable in a finite population ?,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 130, Issue 2, 21 January 1988, Pages 247-251. [HP]
  10. Boyd R, and Richerson PJ. 1988: ''The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 132, Issue 3, 7 June 1988, Pages 337-356. [HP], [PDF]
  11. Vickers, G. T., Cannings, C. (1988): ''Patterns of ESS's I.,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 132, Issue 4, 21 June 1988, Pages 387-408. [HP]
  12. Cannings C. and Vickers GT (1988): ''Patterns of ESS's. II.,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 132, Issue 4, 21 June 1988, Pages 409-420 [HP]
  13. Reinhard Selten: ''Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development,'' Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 16, Issue 3, December 1988, Pages 223-266. [HP]

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1987
  1. Grafen, Alan (1987): ''The logic of divisively asymmetric contests: respect for ownership and the desperado effect,'' Animal Behaviour, Volume 35, Issue 2, April 1987, Pages 462-467. [HP], [PDF]
  2. Joel S. Brown and Thomas L. Vincent (1987): ''Coevolution as an Evolutionary Game,'' Evolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 1987), pp. 66-79. [HP]
  3. Michael L. Rosenzweig, Joel S. Brown and Thomas L. Vincent (1987): ''Red Queens and ESS: The coevolution of evolutionary rates,'' Evolutionary Ecology, Volume 1, Number 1 / 1987年1月, pp. 59-94. [HP]
  4. J. -P. Benoit and V. Krishna: ''Nash Equilibria of Finitely Repeated Games,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 16, Number 3 / 1987年9月, 197-204. [HP]
  5. Jansen, Wolfgang (1987): ''A permanence theorem for replicator and Lotka-Volterra systems,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Vol.25, pp. 411-422. [HP]
  6. Vickery, William L. 1987: ''How to cheat against a simple mixed strategy ESS,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 127, Issue 2, 21 July 1987, Pages 133-139. [HP]
  7. Vickers, G. T. and Cannings, C. 1987: ''On the Definition of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 129, Issue 3, 7 December 1987, Pages 349-353. [HP]
  8. Robert Boyd and Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum : ''No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game,'' Nature, 327(07 May 1987), pp. 58 - 59. [HP]
  9. Joel S. Brown and Thomas L. Vincent (1987) : ''A theory for the evolutionary game,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 31, Issue 1, February 1987, Pages 140-166. [HP]
  10. W.G.S. Hines (1987) : ''Evolutionary Stable Strategies: A review of basic theory,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 31, Issue 2, April 1987, Pages 195-272. [HP]
  11. Karl Sigmund (1987) : ''Game dynamics, mixed strategies, and gradient systems,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 32, Issue 1, August 1987, Pages 114-126. [HP]
  12. Eric Van Damme : Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer-Verlag, 1987, 2nd 1991/07. 【Amazon】

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1986
  1. Axelrod, Robert (1986) : ''An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,'' The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1095-1111. [HP]
  2. Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens : ''On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,'' Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 5, (Sep., 1986), pp. 1003-1037. [HP]
  3. Immanuel M. Bomze, 1986 : ''Non-cooperative, two-person games in biology: a classification,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 15, Number 1 / 1986年3月, pp.31-57. [HP]
  4. M. C. Blad : ''A Dynamic Analysis of the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 15, Number 2 / 1986年6月, pp.83-99. [HP]
  5. Witt, Ulrich (1986) : ''Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts,'' Kyklos, Volume 39 Issue 2, Pages 245 - 266. [HP], [GOOGLE BOOK]
  6. John Maynard Smith : ''Evolutionary Game Theory,'' Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, Volume 22, Issues 1-3, October-November 1986, Pages 43-49. Proceedings of the Fifth Annual International Conference [HP]

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1985
  1. Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna : ''Finitely Repeated Games,'' Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Jul., 1985), pp. 905-922 [HP]
  2. Salim Rashid : ''The approximate purification of mixed strategies with finite observation sets,'' Economics Letters, Volume 19, Issue 2, 1985, Pages 133-135. [HP]
  3. W. G. S. Hines and John Haigh (1985): ''Non-Linear ESS Models and Polymorphism,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 747-756. [HP]
  4. Vincent P. Crawford (1985): ''Learning behavior and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 6, Issue 1, March 1985, Pages 69-78. [HP]
  5. Judd, K. L. (1985): ''The Law of Large Numbers with a Continuum of IID Random Variables,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.35, pp.19-25. [HP]
  6. Friedman, James W. : ''Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 35, Issue 2, August 1985, Pages 390-398. [HP]
  7. Thomas, Bernhard (1985) : ''On evolutionarily stable sets,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 22, Number 1 / 1985年6月, 105-115. [HP]
  8. Vincent, T. L. (1985) : ''Evolutionary games,'' Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Volume 46, Number 4 / 1985年8月, 605-612. [HP]
  9. Milgrom, Paul and Weber, R.: ''Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information,'' Mathematics of Operations Research, 10(1985), 619-632 [PDF]
  10. Ellner, Stephen (1985a): ''ESS germination strategies in randomly varying environments. I. Logistic-type models,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 28, Issue 1, August 1985, Pages 50-79. [HP]
  11. Ellner, Stephen (1985b): ''ESS germination strategies in randomly varying environments. II Reciprocal yield-law models,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 28, Issue 1, August 1985, Pages 80-116. [HP]
  12. Thomas, Bernhard (1985): ''Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Vol.28(1985), 332-341. [HP]

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1984
  1. Wallace J. Dominey (1984): ''Alternative Mating Tactics and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies,'' American Zoologist, Volume 24 (2, 1984), pp. 385-396. [HP]
  2. Van Damme, Eric 1984: ''A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 13, Number 1 / 1984年3月, 1-13. [HP]
  3. R. Cressman, W. G. S. Hines (1984) : ''Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Diploid Populations with Semi-Dominant Inheritance Patterns,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 1-9. [HP]
  4. W. G. S. Hines, D. T. Bishop (1984) : ''On the Local Stability of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in a Diploid Population,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 215-224. [HP]
  5. Ethan Akin and Viktor Losert : ''Evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum games,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 20, Number 3 / 1984年10月, pp.231-258. [HP]
  6. Gunther Palm 1984 : ''Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 19, Number 3 / 1984年7月, pp. 329-334. [HP]
  7. Thomas, Bernhard (1984) : ''Evolutionary stability: States and strategies,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 26, Issue 1, August 1984, Pages 49-67. [HP]
  8. Vincent TL, Brown JS. (1984) : ''Stability in an evolutionary game,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 26, Issue 3, December 1984, Pages 408-427. [HP]
  9. Axelrod, Robert (1984): The Evolution of cooperation, New York, Basic Books. 【Amazon】

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1983
  1. Riechert, S. E.. and Hammerstein, P. 1983: ''Game theory in the ecological context,'' Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Vol. 14, pp. 377-409. [HP], [HP]
  2. W. G. S. Hines and D. T. Bishop (1983): ''Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Diploid Populations with General Inheritance Patterns,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 395-399. [HP]
  3. W. G. S. Hines and D. T. Bishop (1983): ''On Learning and the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy On Learning and the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 689-695 [HP]
  4. Drew Fudenberg, David Levine (1983): ''Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games,'' Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 31, Issue 2, December 1983, Pages 251-268 [PDF]
  5. I. Eshel and E. Akin: ''Co-evolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Vol. 18 (1983), pp. 123-133. [HP]
  6. V. Losert and E. Akin: ''Dynamics of games and genes: Discrete versus continuous time,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 17, Number 2, 1983年6月,241-251 [HP]
  7. Schuster, Peter, and Karl Sigmund (1983): ''Replicator dynamics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 100, Issue 3, 7 February 1983, Pages 533-538. [HP]
  8. Eshel, Ilan (1983): ''Evolutionary and continuous stability,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 103, pp. 99-111. [HP]
  9. Aumann, R.J., Katznelson, Y., Radner, R., Rosenthal, R., Weiss, B., 1983.: Approximate purification of mixed strategies. Mathematics of Operations Research, Volume 8, Issue 3, August 1983, 327-341.
  10. Reinhard Selten: ''Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games,'' Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 5, Issue 3, September 1983, Pages 269-363.[HP]

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1982
  1. E. Akin (1982) : ''Exponential families and game dynamics,'' Canad. J. Math, 34 (1982), pp. 374-405. [HP]
  2. W. G. S. Hines (1982) : ''Mutations, Perturbations and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 1982), pp. 204-209. [HP]
  3. Arneodo, A., Coullet, P., Peyraud, J. and Tresser, C. (1982) : ''Strange Attractors in Volterra Equations for Species in Competition,'' Journal of Mathematical Biology, Volume 14, Number 2 / 1982年6月, 153-157 [HP]
  4. Joel S. Brown, Michael J. Sanderson and Richard E. Michod (1982) : ''Evolution of social behaviour by reciprocation,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 99, Issue 2, 21 November 1982, Pages 319-339. [HP]
  5. Ilan Eshel (1982) : ''Evolutionarily stable strategies and viability selection in Mendelian populations,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 22, Issue 2, October 1982, Pages 204-217. [HP]
  6. Maynard Smith, J. 1982: Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. (邦訳): 寺本英, 梯正之(訳) 『進化とゲーム理論』産業図書, 1985年. 【Amazon】

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1981
  1. Schuster, Peter and Sigmund, Karl (1981): ''Coyness, Philandering and Stable Strategies,'' Animal Behavior, Vol. 29, pp. 186-192 [PDF]
  2. Maynard-Smith J. (1981) : ''Will a sexual population evolve to an ESS?,'' American Naturalist, Vol. 117, pp. 1015-1018. [HP], [HP]
  3. Hammerstein, Peter (1981) : ''The role of asymmetries in animal contests,'' Animal Behaviour, Volume 29, Issue 1, February 1981, Pages 193-205. [HP]
  4. Peter Schuster, Karl Sigmund, Josef Hofbauer, Ramon Gottlieb and Philip Merz 1981: ''Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies III. Games between two populations with selfinteraction,'' Biological Cybernetics, Volume 40, Number 1 / 1981年2月, pp. 9-15. [HP]
  5. W. G. S. Hines (1981): ''Multi-Species Population Models and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jun., 1981), pp. 507-513. [HP]
  6. E.C. Zeeman (1981): ''Dynamics of the evolution of animal conflicts,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 89, Issue 2, 21 March 1981, Pages 249-270. [HP]
  7. Calvin B. Harley (1981): ''Learning the evolutionarily stable strategy,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 89, Issue 4, 21 April 1981, Pages 611-633. [HP]
  8. Robert Axelrod and W.D. Hamilton (1981): ''The evolution of cooperation,'' Science, Vol 211 (1981), Issue 4489, 1390-1396. [HP], [PDF]

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1980
  1. Hines, W. G. S. (1980): ''Three Characterizations of Population Strategy Stability,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 333-340 [HP]
  2. Andris Abakuks (1980): ''Conditions for evolutionarily stable strategies,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 559-562. [HP]
  3. Hines, W. G. S. (1980): ''Strategy stability in complex populations,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp. 600-610. [HP]
  4. Radner, R: ''Collusive behaviour in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives,'' Journal of Economic Theory, 22(2)(1980), 136-154. [PDF]
  5. Hugh N. Comins, William D. Hamilton and Robert M. May. (1980): ''Evolutionarily stable dispersal strategies,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 82, Issue 2, 21 January 1980, Pages 205-230. [HP]
  6. John G. Riley (1980) : ''Strong evolutionary equilibrium and the war of attrition,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 82, Issue 3, 7 February 1980, Pages 383-400. [HP]
  7. Reinhard Selten (1980): ''A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 84, Issue 1, 7 May 1980, Pages 93-101. [HP]

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1979
  1. Grafen, Alan 1979 : ''The hawk-dove game played between relatives,'' Animal Behaviour,, Vol. 27, No.3, pp.905-907. [PDF]
  2. Taylor, Peter D. (1979) : ''Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Player,'' Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 76-83. [HP]
  3. John G. Riley (1979) : ''Evolutionary Equilibrium Strategies,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 76 (1979), Issue 2, 21 January 1979, Pages 109-123. [HP]
  4. H.J. Brockmann, A. Grafen and R. Dawkins (1979) : ''Evolutionarily stable nesting strategy in a digger wasp,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 77 (1979), pp. 473-496. [PDF]
  5. W. G. S. Hines and J. Maynard Smith (1979) : ''Games between relatives,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 79, Issue 1, 7 July 1979, Pages 19-30. [HP]
  6. Hofbauer, J., P.Schuster, and K.Sigmund (1979) : ''A note on evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 81, Issue 3, 7 December 1979, Pages 609-612. [HP]
  7. Knowlton, N. and Parker, G.A. (1979) : ''An evolutionarily stable strategy approach to indiscriminate spite,'' Nature, Volume 279, pp. 419 - 421 (31 May 1979). [HP]
  8. J. Maynard Smith (1979) : ''Game Theory and the Evolution of Behaviour,'' Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Science, Vol. 205, No. 1161, The Evolution of Adaptation by Natural Selection (Sep. 21, 1979), pp. 475-488. [HP], [HP 2]

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1978
  1. Myerson, R.B. (1978): ''Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 7, Number 2 / 1978年6月, pp. 73-80. [HP]
  2. W.G.S. Hines (1978): ''A generalized war of attrition,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 70, Issue 1, 7 January 1978, Pages 85-124. [HP]
  3. D.T. Bishop, C. Cannings and J. Maynard Smith (1978): ''The war of attrition with random rewards,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 74, Issue 3, 7 October 1978, Pages 377-388. [HP]
  4. Peter D Taylor, Leo B. Jonker : ''Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics,'' Mathematical Biosciences, Volume 40, Issues 1-2, July 1978, Pages 145-156 . [HP]
  5. Auslander D, Guckenheimer J, Oster G. (1978) : ''Random evolutionarily stable strategies,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 13, Issue 2, April 1978, Pages 276-293. [HP]
  6. M. Mirmirani and G. Oster (1978) : ''Competition, kin selection, and evolutionary stable strategies,'' Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 13, Issue 3, June 1978, Pages 304-339. [HP]

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1977
  1. Norman, Richard F., Taylor, Peter D. and Robertson, Raleigh J. (1977) : ''Stable equilibrium strategies and penalty functions in a game of attriction,''Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 65, Issue 3, 7 April 1977, Pages 571-578. [HP]

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1976
  1. Bishop, D. T. and Cannings, C. (1976): ''Models of animal conflict,'' Advances in Applied Probability, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 616-621. [HP]

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1975
  1. Haigh, J. 1975 : ''Game theory and evolution,'' Advances in Applied Probability, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 8-11. [HP]
  2. R. Selten : ''Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.4 (1975), pp.25-55. [HP]

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1974
  1. Maynard Smith, J. 1974: ''The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts,'' Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 47, Issue 1, September 1974, pp. 209-221. [HP]

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1973
  1. John C. Harsanyi: : ''Games with Randomly Distributed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points,'' International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.2, pp.1-23. [HP]
  2. Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G. R. (1973): ''The Logic of Animal Conflict,'' Nature, Vol. 246, pp. 15 - 18 (02 November 1973); doi:10.1038/246015a0 [HP]

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1972


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